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Abstract 
Since the Russo-Georgian war and the start of military reform in 2008, 
the importance of military means in Russia’s foreign policy toolbox has in-
creased. This is especially true of the post-Soviet space, where Moscow’s vital 
security interests and regional ambitions converge. Russia is pursuing three 
goals here: it wants to ward off threats, secure its supremacy over the region 
and limit the room for manoeuvre of external actors, such as the US, NATO 
or China. In doing so, it is guided by a three-level approach which consists 
of strengthening unilateral power projection capabilities and expanding 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
The balance of Russian military policy in the post-Soviet space is mixed. It 
is true that, today, Russia’s significantly modernised armed forces can cover 
a broad spectrum of operations and exert political pressure through a show 
of force. On the other hand, Moscow’s attempt to establish one-sided depend-
encies through military cooperation has proven to be only partially achiev-
able. As in the political and economic spheres, it is also evident in the mili-
tary sphere that Russia’s desire for a zone of influence clashes with the 
reality of an increasingly differentiated area. The intervention in Ukraine 
intensified this trend, as even hitherto close allies of Russia in the CSTO mili-
tary alliance now show more scepticism in their cooperation with their large 
neighbour. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Russia’s Military Policy in the 
Post-Soviet Space.  
Aims, Instruments and Perspectives 
The post-Soviet space is at the heart of the still un-
resolved conflict over the configuration of the Euro-
pean security order. At the same time, the increased 
importance of military means in Russia’s foreign 
policy toolbox is most noticeable here. Although Mos-
cow made use of its armed forces in Moldova (1992), 
Georgia (1992–1994) and Tajikistan (1992) as early as 
the 1990s, these were limited ‘peacekeeping’ opera-
tions. The intervention in Georgia in August 2008 
signalled the beginning of a new phase. For the first 
time since the end of the Cold War, Russia led an 
interstate war to secure its regional hegemonic claim 
and draw red lines against Western actors. The covert 
intervention in Ukraine since 2014 has also served 
this goal. 
The present study examines the aims, instruments 
and perspectives of Russian military policy in the post-
Soviet space. The Baltic states are excluded because 
they have been members of the EU and NATO since 
2004. Unlike the other former Soviet republics, this 
has changed the framework conditions for Russian 
action. 
Russia’s military policy in the post-Soviet space is 
to ward off threats, control the region as a hegemon 
and limit the scope for action of external actors. To 
achieve this, Moscow is pursuing a three-level ap-
proach which consists of strengthening its unilateral 
power projection capabilities as well as its bilateral 
and multilateral connectivity mechanisms. 
Moscow achieves its best outcomes at the unilat-
eral level. The military reform carried out since 2008 
reinforced the pre-existing superiority of the Russian 
armed forces. The reform significantly modernised its 
arsenal and increased the operational readiness of its 
armed forces. In addition, Moscow extended its pool 
of irregular ‘proxies’ needed for unconventional mis-
sions. Furthermore, since 2008 Russia has expanded 
its forward presence in the region. As a result, Rus-
sia’s armed forces are well placed to conduct a wide 
range of operations in the region – from crisis 
management to counter-terrorism and unconvention-
al and conventional wars – and to exert political 
pressure through a credible ‘show of force’. 
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On the other hand, Moscow’s attempt to create 
one-sided dependencies on Russia through bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation was not completely 
viable. With the exception of Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine (since 2014), all post-Soviet countries have 
cooperated with Russia on armaments, training 
or exercises. However, Moscow can only develop a 
hegemonic model of cooperation with those terri-
tories and states that depend on Russia’s military 
protection and lack alternative partners. This applies 
to the separatist territories of Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Transnistria and to Armenia, Tajikistan and, to a 
certain extent, Kyrgyzstan. Even the attempt to assert 
its own leadership claim through a military alliance, 
namely the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO), had only limited success. As in the economic 
and political sphere, it is also evident in the military 
sphere that Russia’s claim to its own sphere of in-
fluence has long since clashed with the reality of a 
now highly differentiated area. 
In recent years, Russia has increased its power 
projection capabilities not only in this region but 
out of it, too. With a build-up of arms in the military 
district ‘West’ and in Crimea, its strengthened mili-
tary presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well 
as its joint air defence with Belarus and Armenia, 
Russia is expanding its position on the Western 
border, and particularly in the Black Sea region. This 
presents even more of a challenge for the Atlantic 
Alliance and its member states because conventional 
arms control is in a deep crisis. Firstly, Germany 
should, therefore, continue to participate in the 
necessary reassurance measures for the Eastern and 
Southeastern alliance members. Secondly, it should 
continue its efforts within NATO and vis-à-vis Moscow 
to modernise military transparency, trust and limi-
tation measures. 
The cases of Russian coercive diplomacy in the 
post-Soviet space are not only a military, but also a 
regulatory challenge for Germany and NATO. The 
wars in Georgia and Ukraine violated the basic 
principles agreed in the Paris Charter in 1990. This 
triggered a deep crisis of trust, which reduces the 
chances of NATO or its member states finding a 
common approach with Russia with regard to solving 
problems in the post-Soviet space, while, at the same 
time, the need for such cooperation increases. The 
dangers of unintended escalation in cases of ‘un-
resolved conflicts’ as well as transnational dangers 
show how necessary this is. As long as there is no 
return to ‘business as usual’, it would be possible 
to build on successful projects initiated by the NATO-
Russia Council, which could be developed further 
with greater participation from other states in the 
region. One such example is the fight against drug 
smuggling from Afghanistan. 
There is a growing opportunity for NATO and its 
members to develop relations with other post-Soviet 
countries. Since the crisis over Ukraine, scepticism 
towards Russia has grown. This opens up the possibil-
ity of entering into dialogue with or even intensifying 
cooperation with states that have, so far, largely been 
militarily aligned with Russia, such as Kazakhstan, 
Armenia or Belarus. Offers of cooperation could be 
aimed at reducing transnational security risks, re-
storing trust and transparency, and strengthening 
their resilience to ‘hybrid threats’. 
 
 “Zone of privileged interests” 
 SWP Berlin 
 Russia’s Military Policy in the Post-Soviet Space 
 January 2019 
 7 
Since the war in Georgia and the start of Russian mili-
tary reform in 2008, the importance of hard power 
instruments to Russia’s foreign policy has increased 
significantly. Russian leaders perceive military might 
as an indispensable prerequisite for successfully 
asserting their national interests. Putin warned in an 
article in 2012 that, “we should not tempt anyone by 
allowing ourselves to be weak”. Strong forces are, “an 
indispensable condition for Russia to feel secure and 
for our partners to heed our country’s arguments”.1 
As a result, Russia increasingly demonstrated its mili-
tary capabilities to the outside world (show of force) 
or even utilised them, as in Georgia (2008), Ukraine 
(from 2014) and Syria (from 2015). The threat of mili-
tary force and its deployment became an integral part 
of Russia’s coercive diplomacy. Its aim is to get other 
states to refrain from unwanted behaviour or display 
a desired behaviour. 
The importance of military 
instruments in Russia’s foreign policy 
has risen sharply. 
The armed forces became a crucial instrument for 
exerting influence, but are also used as an amplifier 
for non-military means. They are used both openly 
and covertly. In addition, Moscow employs its mili-
tary instruments to expand cooperation with other 
states. Military cooperation is playing an increasingly 
important role in consolidating existing or developing 
new partnerships, such as the armaments cooperation 
with Turkey or joint exercises with China and Egypt. 
 
1 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guaran-
tees for Russia”, Russia Today, 19 February 2012, https://www. 
rt.com/politics/official-word/strong-putin-military-russia-711/. 
See also Putin’s speech to the 2018 Federal Assembly in which 
he accused the US of ignoring Russian security concerns 
while Russia’s armed forces were weak. The nuclear mod-
ernisation projects announced would mean that Washington 
would now have to listen. “Presidential Address to the Fed-
eral Assembly”, President of Russia (official website), 1 March 
2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957. 
The growing importance of military means is par-
ticularly noticeable in Russia’s policy towards the 
post-Soviet space. All previous missions by Russia’s 
armed forces (except for peacekeeping operations in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and the intervention 
in Syria) took place in the territory of the former 
USSR. Also, military cooperative approaches, i.e. a 
bilateral cooperation or multilateral alliance system, 
are most pronounced in this region. 
“Zone of privileged interests” 
The objectives of Russian military policy in the post-
Soviet space are shaped by Russian leaders’ ambitions 
and their perceptions of threats in the region. They 
define Russia as a great power and, as a result, aim 
to restore international recognition for Russia’s self-
proclaimed status through its foreign and security 
policy.2 At a global level, Russia is seeking to position 
itself as an independent pole in a multipolar world 
order. While it claims a say on all important global 
issues, it pursues hegemonic ambitions in the post-
Soviet space. This is because, in Moscow’s traditional 
understanding, control of its own sphere of influence 
is considered an indispensable prerequisite for acting 
as a great power. At the same time, the Russian lead-
ership does not specify expressis verbis the geographi-
cal limits of the claimed zone of influence. It uses terms 
 
2 In the National Security Strategy from 2015, Russia is 
referred to as “one of the world’s leading powers”. According 
to Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept from 2016, the task of for-
eign policy is to consolidate the country’s status as “a centre 
of influence in the world today”. “Strategija nacional’noj 
bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii” [The National Security 
Strategy of the Russian Federation], Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossijskoj 
Federaсii [The Security Council of the Russian Federation] 
(official website), 31 Dececmber 2015, http://www.scrf.gov. 
ru/security/docs/document133/; “Foreign Policy Concept of 
the Russian Federation”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation (official website), 1 December 2016, http:// 
www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_ documents/-/asset_ 
publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/ 2542248. 
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such as ‘near abroad‘,3 ‘zone of interest’4 or ‘zone of 
privileged interests’5 which are kept intentionally 
fluid in order to maintain strategic ambiguity. In es-
sence, this is the post-Soviet area, although the extent 
to which the Baltic States are included is left open. 
The Russian leadership does not use the unambig-
uous term ‘zone of influence’ itself and prefers to 
speak of the need for close cooperation and integra-
tion resulting from historically grown ties.6 In fact, 
Russia and the post-Soviet states continue to be closely 
linked economically, culturally and also in terms of 
security policy, so a need for cooperation does exist. 
The relations and order model being pursued by Mos-
cow is, however, not based on cooperation among 
peers, but ultimately on the acceptance of Russian 
hegemony, thus corresponding to the concept of a 
zone of influence. Moscow’s claim to leadership in 
the post-Soviet space includes the right to define the 
rules of the game that apply there and to limit exter-
nal actors’ room for manoeuvre. Although the sover-
eignty of the countries concerned is formally recog-
nised, it is perceived as limited.7 In military policy 
 
3 William Safire, “On Language; The Near Abroad”, The New 
York Times Magazine, 22 May 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html. 
4 “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 14.09.1995 g. 
No. 940 ‘Ob utverzhdenii strategicheskogo kursa Rossijskoj 
Federacii s gosudarstvami – uchastnikami Sodruzhestva 
Nesavisimych Gosudarstv’” [Decree of the President of the 
Russian Federation from 14 September 1995, No. 940, “Set-
ting the strategic course of the Russian Federation with the 
participating countries of the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States”], Prezident Rossii [President of Russia] (official web-
site), 14 September 1995, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/8307. 
5 “Interview Given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Chan-
nels Channel One, Rossia, NTV”, President of Russia (official 
website), 31 August 2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ 
president/transcripts/48301. 
6 Even though political leaders avoid the term “zone of in-
fluence”, it is certainly used as self-ascription in the political 
and military debate. For instance, influential military think-
ers Chekinov and Bogdanov call the post-Soviet space a “zone 
of traditional influence”. S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, 
“Osobennosti obecpechenija voennoj bezopasnosti Rossii v 
XXI stoletii v usloviach globalizacii” [The Features of Ensur-
ing Military Security in 21st Century Russia in Conditions of 
Globalisation], Voennaya Mysl’, no. 6 (2016): 37–51 (50). 
7 Although Russia has recognised the territorial integrity 
and state sovereignty of Ukraine in international treaties, 
this is considered an artificial construct, as can be seen in 
Putin’s statement that Russians and Ukrainians are “basically 
one people”. “Bol’shaya press-konferenciya Vladimira Pu-
terms, this means that Moscow implicitly rejects the 
right of the post-Soviet states to freely choose alliances 
and demands a veto over any military cooperation 
with third countries that could be perceived as a threat 
to Russia.8 Russia’s leaders consider maintaining secu-
rity in the post-Soviet space a prerogative of its coun-
try, including the right to intervene unilaterally.9 
As early as the 1990s, Moscow deployed its armed 
forces in conflicts in Moldova (Transnistria) and Geor-
gia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) without respecting the 
OSCE’s mandates of neutrality or the consent of all 
parties to the conflict.10 After the Russo-Georgian War 
in 2008, Russia expanded the deployment options 
 
tina” [Major Press Conference by Vladimir Putin], Prezident 
Rossii [President of Russia] (official website), 14 December 
2017, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56378. This 
view is also shared by large parts of the population. In an 
opinion poll conducted by research institute Levada in 2017, 
61 percent of respondents would not classify Belarus and 
Ukraine, and 44 percent Georgia, as “foreign countries”. 
However, only 25 percent considered it right that Russia use 
all available means – including military ones – to keep the 
former Soviet republics under its control; 65 percent did not 
agree. “Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia” [International Rela-
tions], Levada-Zentr (official website), 2 February 2017, http:// 
www.levada.ru/2017/02/02/mezhdunarodnye-otnosheniya-5/. 
8 In 1995, President Yeltsin had already called for the CIS 
states not to join an alliance directed against one member 
state. He also called for third countries or international orga-
nisations to cooperate with CIS member countries on the 
assumption that they were “first and foremost a Russian 
zone of interest”. Similarly, the draft contract on Euro-
Atlantic security regulations presented by then President 
Medvedev in 2008 stipulates that no actor should undertake 
actions that are perceived by the other side as endangering 
their own security. However, no objective criteria are spe-
cified as to what actions should be taken. Under this subjec-
tively interpretable category, Russia could have denied the 
post-Soviet states close adherence to and accession to NATO. 
Ten years after the Russo-Georgian war, Prime Minister 
Medvedev warned Georgia and NATO of a “terrible conflict” 
should the country join the Alliance. “Ukaz Prezidenta Ros-
sijskoj Federacii ot 14.09.1995” (see note 4); “The Draft of the 
European Security Treaty”, President of Russia (official website), 
29 November 2009, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/275; “Med-
vedev Warns against Conflict”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
7 August 2018, 8. 
9 In March 1993, President Yeltsin urged international 
organisations to grant Russia “special powers as a guarantor 
of peace and stability in the former Soviet territories”. Itar-
Tass, 1 March 1993. 
10 See Roy Allison, Russia, the West, and Military Intervention 
(Oxford, 2013). 
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for its armed forces abroad. Until then, the “Law on 
Defence” had only allowed Moscow to deploy its army 
outside its own territory to ward off an armed attack 
on its own territory or that of its allies, to combat 
international terrorism, or to conduct peacekeeping 
operations. An amendment to the law in November 
2009 now makes this possible when another country 
requests military assistance, to repulse an armed 
attack on Russian soldiers stationed abroad or to pro-
tect Russian citizens abroad from armed assault.11 
Since the wording is deliberately vague, Russian 
leaders have a wide scope of interpretation to justify 
military intervention in the post-Soviet space, going 
beyond defending itself against attack on its own 
territory or peacekeeping and anti-terrorist opera-
tions. If the fall of a pro-Russian government threat-
ens to result in a ‘colour revolution’, Moscow can 
intervene in response to a request for help from the 
head of state. Regardless of whether the respective 
state leaders agree, Moscow could intervene if Russian 
troops stationed in the country or Russian citizens 
residing there were attacked. Above all, the phrase 
“protection of Russian citizens abroad” gives Moscow 
effective leverage that it has used increasingly since 
the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. In Kazakhstan 
(21 percent), Ukraine (17 percent), Kyrgyzstan (9 per-
cent) and Belarus (8 percent), the share of ethnic Rus-
sians in the total population is particularly large.12 
With its policy of passportizacija, i.e. liberally granting 
Russian passports, Moscow is continually expanding 
the number of Russian “protected objects”, predomi-
nantly in conflict areas such as Abkhazian, South Osse-
tia, Transnistria and Crimea.13 Twice already, in Geor-
 
11 “O vnesenii izmenenij v Federal’nyj zakon ‘ob oborone’” 
[On the introduction of amendments to the Federal Law “On 
Defence”], Rossijskaya Gazeta, 9 November 2009, https://rg.ru/ 
2009/11/13/armia-dok.html. 
12 In Moldova, including the breakaway region of Trans-
nistria, ethnic Russians accounted for 9 percent, Turkmeni-
stan 5 percent and Uzbekistan, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Tajikistan less than 3 percent each of their respective 
national populations. Figures refer to the last census in the 
respective countries. 
13 The russkij mir (Russian World) concept goes even 
further. In it, Moscow appears as a protective power not 
only of Russian citizens and ethnic Russians, but also of 
the Russian-speaking population and all those people who, 
as Putin put it, “see themselves as part of Russia and regard 
Russia as their homeland”. Although the broad russkij mir 
protection claim does not give the Russian President any 
legal authority to use troops abroad, nevertheless, it can 
gia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014, Moscow justified 
its military intervention through, among other things, 
the alleged need to defend Russian citizens.14 
Perceived threats 
In the Russian security discourse, the post-Soviet 
space is given a key role in ensuring national security. 
This is not only because of its geographic proximity, 
but also due to the numerous overlapping conflict 
situations. The military doctrine of 2014 refers to 
both the dangers and threats to Russia posed by the 
post-Soviet countries themselves and by those that 
affect the region from outside.15 The former includes 
 
increase political pressure on a target country. During the 
Ukraine crisis in 2014, Putin repeatedly referred to the con-
cept of russkij mir, but has not used it since. “Reception to 
Mark National Unity Day”, President of Russia (official website), 
4 November 2013, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ 
news/19562; cf. Vera Zakem, Paul Saunders and Daniel 
Antoun, Mobilizing Compatriots: Russia’s Strategy, Tactics, and 
Influence in the Former Soviet Union (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2015). 
14 Russia’s leaders justified the intervention in Georgia in 
2008 as self-defence since Russian peacekeepers had been 
shot in South Ossetia. In addition, they referred – still with 
no corresponding legal basis – to the protection of Russian 
citizens, which had previously come from their own pass-
portizacija policy in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On 1 March 
2014, Putin had the Federation Council grant approval for 
an intervention in Ukraine to protect the lives of “citizens 
of the Russian Federation, our compatriots and personnel of 
the military contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation stationed in the territory of Ukraine”. “Vladimir 
Putin vnes obrashchenie v Sovet Federacii” [Speech delivered 
by Vladimir Putin to the Federation Council], Prezident Rossii 
[President of Russia] (official website), 1 March 2014, http:// 
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20353. See Emmanuel 
Karagiannis, “The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and 
Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and 
Goals”, Contemporary Security Policy 35, no. 3 (2014): 400–20. 
15 Military doctrine distinguishes between military dangers 
and threats, the former being the precursor to the latter. Ac-
cording to the doctrine, the following developments are clas-
sified as dangers in the “neighbourhood of Russia”: “armed 
conflicts and their escalation”, “interethnic and interdenomi-
national tensions”, “activities of radical international armed 
groups and private military companies” and the “establish-
ment of regimes that compromise Russian interests”. “Mili-
tary threat” means “military demonstration of power in the 
course of exercises” and the “intensification of the activity 
of armed forces including their partial or full mobilization”. 
“Voennaja Doktrina Rossijskoj Federacii” [Military Doctrine 
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a violent escalation of multiple conflicts in the post-
Soviet space which Russia could not control. These 
include ethnoterritorial disputes between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan near Nagorno-Karabakh, between the 
Georgian government and the breakaway areas of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, between Moldova and 
the separatists in Transnistria and between Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Fergana Valley. 
In addition, there are conflicts over resources and 
unsolved succession arrangements in the region’s 
authoritarian power systems. Some conflicts are 
deliberately fuelled by Russia in order to expand its 
own influence. Behind this strategy is the idea of 
controlled instability. However, a policy of this kind 
cannot eliminate the risk that these conflicts escalate 
without or even against Russia’s intentions and then 
might have a negative impact on Russia. The same 
applies to the risks associated with military interven-
tion.16 An example of how quickly supposedly frozen 
conflicts can heat up again occurred in April 2016 
when fighting broke out between Azerbaijani soldiers 
and fighters from the breakaway enclave of Nagorno-
Karabakh and 30 people died over four days. In order 
to prevent the fighting from ending in direct military 
conflict between Baku and Yerevan, Moscow inter-
vened at diplomatic level. It was eager to avoid a direct 
attack by Azerbaijani troops on Armenian territory 
(not on Nagorno-Karabakh), because Yerevan could 
then have demanded alliance solidarity from Moscow. 
While in Russian military doctrine the escalation 
of conflicts in and between the post-Soviet states is 
considered a “danger”, certain military activities by 
Georgia and Ukraine that Moscow is in open conflict 
with are considered “threats”. These include the vari-
ous rounds of partial mobilisations in Ukraine since 
 
of the Russian Federation], Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Federacii 
[Security Council of the Russian Federation] (official website), 
25 December 2014, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/ 
document129/. 
16 See Sabine Fischer, “Russian Policy in the Unresolved 
Conflicts”, in Not Frozen! The Unresolved Conflicts over Transnis-
tria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Light of the 
Crisis over Ukraine, (ed.) Sabine Fischer, SWP Research Paper 
9/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 
2016): 9–24; Rossijskij Sovet po Mezhdunarodnym Delam 
[Russian International Affairs Council] (ed.), Konflikty na post-
sovetskom prostranstve: perspektivy uregulirovanija i rol’ Rossii 
[Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space: Perspectives on Regula-
tion and the Role of Russia] (Moscow, 2016). 
2014, as well as larger exercises.17 The risk of an un-
intended military confrontation with Tbilisi seems 
rather low at the moment, given that Georgia’s cur-
rent leaders have no ambitions to recapture the 
breakaway areas through military force and the para-
military forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are 
controlled by Russia. In contrast, the situation in the 
Donbas is much more volatile because violent non-
state actors are much more autonomous and the 
domestic dynamics of the Ukrainian election cam-
paign in 2019 may provide incentives for leaders to 
take a more robust stance. Since Russia completed 
the bridge across the Strait of Kerch in May 2018, the 
Sea of Azov has also become a third conflict point 
between Russia and Ukraine after Crimea and Don-
bas. How serious the potential for military escalation 
between Russia and Ukraine is, was seen in November 
2018 when Russian border guard’s vessels shot at 
Ukrainian patrol boats in the strait of Kerch. 
Beyond the security risks arising from the region, 
Moscow traditionally views the post-Soviet states as 
a buffer against military threats and external risks, 
both transnational and inter-state. Accordingly, the 
Central Asian states are seen as a protective shield 
against security risks from Afghanistan and, in the 
long term, against a further strengthening China, 
while the South Caucasus countries are seen as a 
buffer against possible dangers from the Middle East. 
The post-Soviet states bordering on NATO countries, 
in particular, have become more important as an 
upstream defence ring. The reassurance measures 
agreed by the Atlantic Alliance for its Eastern mem-
ber states in the wake of the crisis over Ukraine are 
seen in Moscow as part of an ultimately offensive 
rearmament, for example the US and NATO strategic 
missile defence plans.18 
 
17 Georgia and Ukraine cooperate with Western partners 
on multilateral manoeuvres. In 2017, 2,800 soldiers from 
Georgia, the US, UK, Germany, Turkey, Ukraine and Slovenia 
took part in Noble Trident in Georgia. The Rapid Trident 
exercise took place in the same year in Ukraine with 1,650 
soldiers from 15 countries. 
18 NATO responded to the crisis over Ukraine with re-
assurance measures for eastern member states and amend-
ments to the Atlantic Alliance’s military posture as a whole. 
Reassurance measures include increased air policing in the 
Baltic States, more exercises in the eastern member states 
(e.g. Sabre Strike 2018 with 18,000 soldiers) or the formally 
rotation-based deployment of four multinational NATO 
battlegroups in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland (En-
hanced Forward Presence). The adaptation measures are 
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Moscow has become increasingly concerned over 
the activities of external actors in the post-Soviet 
space that undermine its own claim to leadership. 
Though they have not expressed it directly, Russia’s 
leaders are uneasy about China’s increasing power. 
Russia regards having a strong military position in 
the post-Soviet space, and especially in Central Asia, 
as reassurance against the growing economic and 
political importance of China. Nevertheless, Moscow 
sees itself much more strongly challenged by Western 
countries and institutions, particularly the US and 
NATO. In its 2015 National Security Strategy, Russian 
leaders accused Western actors of undermining Rus-
sia’s integration processes in the region and fuelling 
tensions there.19 The Atlantic Alliance’s promise to 
Georgia and Ukraine,20 albeit without any specific 
date, and US-NATO military cooperation with post-
Soviet states is seen by Moscow as an attempt to push 
Russia out of its traditional buffer and/or zone of 
influence.21 
For some time now, the Russian leadership has felt 
threatened in its quest for supremacy in the post-
Soviet space not only by the ‘hard power’ of NATO 
and the US, but increasingly by the ‘soft power’ of 
Western states and institutions. The social and politi-
cal changes brought about by the EU’s association 
and free trade agreements with countries such as 
Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia limit 
Russia’s scope for influence. At the same time, Rus-
sian leaders do not consider ‘colour revolutions’ to be 
the result of social or political dissatisfaction among 
the populations of these countries, but as a ‘soft’ vari-
ant of Western interventionism or a “new form of 
Western warfare”, as Russian Chief of General Staff, 
 
reflected above all in the strengthening of Alliance defence 
capabilities. 
19 “Strategija nacional’noj bezopasnosti” (see note 2); 
“O vnesenii izmenenij v Federal’nyj zakon ‘ob oborone’” 
(see note 11). 
20 In April 2008, NATO promised Georgia and Ukraine 
membership, but did not name a specific date. “Bucharest 
Summit Declaration”, NATO (official website), 3 April 2008, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_8443.htm. 
21 The expansion of NATO, the “deployment of foreign 
troops” in the neighbourhood of Russia and “bringing mili-
tary infrastructure” to the borders of Russia are seen as a 
danger in military doctrine and “military demonstration 
of power in the course of exercises” as a threat. “Voennaya 
Doktrina Rossijskoj Federacii” (see note 15). 
Valery Gerasimov, put it in February 2013.22 They are 
purportedly aimed at weakening Russia by replacing 
pro-Russian regimes with those that “threaten Rus-
sia”, or by creating “a zone of chaos” around Russia, 
eventually leading to regime change in Russia itself.23 
The military intervention of Libya by Western states 
in 2011, which was justified as protecting humanitar-
ian interests but at the same time led to regime 
change and the killing of Gaddafi, has hardened Rus-
sia’s position on this issue considerably. 
Objectives and levels of Russian military 
policy in the post-Soviet space 
The special position of the post-Soviet space in Rus-
sian military policy results from the fact that only 
there do hegemonic claims and vital security interests 
converge. The objectives of Moscow’s military policy 
in this region are correspondingly broad. It is not just 
a question of warding off threats and dangers, but 
also of controlling the region and limiting the range 
of actions available to external actors. 
To this end, Moscow is pursuing a three-level 
approach. At the unilateral level, it seeks to strengthen 
the power projection capabilities of the Russian 
armed forces in the post-Soviet space. These should 
be able to cover a wide range of requirements from 
conducting crisis management operations aimed at 
averting transnational threats and peacekeeping 
operations, to unconventional and conventional 
warfare operations aimed at asserting its interests 
and deterring external actors. The second level in-
cludes Russia’s bilateral military cooperation with 
post-Soviet countries. The aim here is to combat 
common threats more effectively, but at the same 
time create hegemonic dependencies in Moscow’s 
favour, through cooperation on armaments, training 
and exercises. Moscow has similar objectives at the 
 
22 Valerij Gerasimov, “Cennost’ nauki i predvidenija” 
[The Value of Science and Foresight], Voenno-promyshlennyj 
kur’er, 26 February 2013, https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/ 
14632; Valerij Gerasimov, “Mir na granjach vojny” [Peace 
on the Verge of War], Voenno-promyshlennyj kur’er, 13 March 
2017, https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/35591. 
23 See A. Belskij and O. Klimenko, “Politicheskie techno-
logii cvetnych revolucii” [The Political Technologies of 
Colour Revolutions], Voennaya Mysl’, no. 9 (2014): 3–11; V. I. 
Vorobjev and V. A. Kitselev, “Strategii sokrushenija i izmora 
v novom oblike” [The Encircling Strategy in a New Guise], 
Voennaya Mysl’, no. 3 (2014): 45–57. 
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third level, multilateral cooperation with the post-
Soviet states. The Collective Security Treaty Organiza-
tion (CSTO) serves not only to strengthen capabilities 
for combatting external and transnational dangers, 
but also to legitimise Russia’s claim to be the leading 
regional power.24 
 
24 See “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 14.09.1995” 
(see note 4); “Ukaz Prezidenta ‘O strategii nacional’noj bezo-
pasnosti’” (see note 2]; “O vnesenii izmenenij v Federal’nyj 
zakon ‘ob oborone’” (see note 11); “Voennaja Doktrina Ros-
sijskoj Federacii” (see note 15). 
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The following section analyses Russia’s unilateral 
military power projection capabilities. Power is 
not understood in the sense of outcome, but as a 
resource. Consequently, no statements can be made 
about the chances of success of potential Russian 
military actions, since their impact depends on other 
contextual factors such as topography, resistance 
from the local population and response from external 
actors. Rather, it is a question of the military power 
resources available to Russia.25 
Military superiority 
Russia’s armed forces are superior, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively, to those of other post-Soviet coun-
tries to varying degrees. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Russia inherited the bulk of the Soviet 
army, including its arsenal and infrastructure. Fur-
thermore, Russia began to comprehensively reform 
its armed forces in autumn 2018, after the Russo-
Georgian war. The successes in modernisation 
 
25 Of the multitude of potential parameters, we look at 
those that are important to Russia for its objectives in the 
post-Soviet space. These include the state of the Russian 
armed forces in relation to those of other post-Soviet coun-
tries. An assessment was made based on budget resources, 
weapon systems, personnel and levels of professionalisation 
and training. It is important not only to consider regular 
soldiers, but also non-regular proxies which play a major 
role in hybrid operations. The present paper also considers 
rapid deployment and forward military presence (military 
bases) because these factors are necessary in order to project 
power in the region. See Ashley J. Tellis et al., Measuring 
National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Santa Monica, CA, 
2000), 133–76; David Clowes and Dominika Choroś-Mro-
zowska, “Aspects of Global Security – the Measurement of 
Power & Its Projection: Results from Twenty Selected Coun-
tries (2000–2013)”, Journal of International Studies 8, no. 1 
(2015): 53–66. 
achieved since then are particularly noticeable when 
compared to the armed forces of other post-Soviet 
states. To date, most of their armed forces have hardly 
been reformed at all, or only in individual areas. 
The Russian defence budget grew from $24.6 bil-
lion in 2008 to $45.6 billion in 2017.26 In the same 
period, only Azerbaijan increased its defence budget 
by a similar percentage. Budget growth in other coun-
tries is either more moderate (Kazakhstan) or has so far 
been short-lived (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus). 
In 2017, the Russian military budget was 17 times high-
er than the second strongest in the region (Ukraine), 
29 times higher than the third strongest (Azerbaijan) 
and 1,572 times higher than the weakest (Moldova).27 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Red Army, most 
of its extensive arsenal was transferred to the newly 
created Russian armed forces, but was poorly main-
tained in the 1990s and early 2000s. It was not until 
the 2008 military reform that Russia set itself the goal 
 
26 The figures used here correspond to the narrow defini-
tion of the Russian budget item ‘National Defence’. Where 
expenses included in other Russian budget items need to be 
added so they meet the NATO definition of defence spend-
ing, then these figures are significantly higher, i.e. $61.7 bil-
lion in 2017. The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS) (ed.), The Military Balance. The Annual Assessment of Global 
Military Capabilities and Defense Economics (London, 2018), 192. 
In 2017, the defence budget fell for the first time since the 
introduction of military reform. However, this is not a fun-
damental change of policy; rather, budget allocations to the 
military had peaked before 2016. Modest cuts were made in 
2017 due to general budgetary savings and financial adjust-
ment measures. See Janis Kluge, Russlands Staatshaushalt unter 
Druck. Finanzielle und politische Risiken der Stagnation, SWP-Stu-
die 14/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 
2018), 25. 
27 IISS (ed.), The Military Balance (see note 26). 
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of substantially modernising its military hardware.28 
Moscow launched an ambitious arms programme29 
that should see the share of modern weapons rise 
to 70 percent by 2020. Despite financial difficulties, 
supply and production problems in the Russian 
defence industry, European sanctions on “dual-use” 
goods (since 2014) and the termination of the arms 
cooperation with Ukraine (since 2014), Russia has 
been able to significantly modernise its forces’ arma-
ments and equipment since 2008. While defence 
companies mainly based their designs on Soviet blue-
prints into the mid-2000s, they are now developing 
and constructing completely new systems. As a result, 
the proportion of ‘modern’ systems in 2017 rose to 
42 percent in the Army, 47 percent in the Navy and 
62 percent in the Aerospace Forces.30 In addition, the 
Russian armed forces invested in capabilities that are 
either not or only to a limited extent available to other 
post-Soviet states, particularly in the cyber sector.31 
These qualitative improvements further increase 
Russia’s quantitative superiority in the region. In con-
 
28 Jurij Gavrilov, “Krizis: Armiya ne otstupaet” [Crisis: The 
Army Is Not Retreating], Rossijskaja Gazeta, 19 March 2009, 
https://rg.ru/2009/03/19/krizis.html. 
29 The “State Armaments Programme 2011–2020” was 
allocated 19 trillion roubles, at that time the equivalent of 
580 billion euros. There has been a hefty debate between the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defence since 2016 
over the subsequent “State Armaments Programme 2018–
2027”. At 19 trillion roubles, 274 billion euros at the current 
exchange rate, it represents a compromise. Richard Connolly 
and Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s New State Armament Programme: 
Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities 
to 2027 (London: Chatham House, 10 May 2018); Ivan Safro-
nov and Alexandra Dzhordzhevich, “19 trillionov prinimajut 
na vooruzhenie” [Defence Gets 19 Trillion], Kommersant, 15 
November 2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3467573. 
30 “Ministr oborony Rossijskoj Federacii Sergej Shojgu vys-
tupil na zasedanii Gosdumy v ramkach ‘pravitel’stvennogo 
chasa’” [Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei 
Schoigu, at the meeting of the State Duma during the gov-
ernment session], Ministerstvo Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii [Min-
istry of Defense of the Russian Federation] (official website), 
22 February 2017, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/ 
more.htm?id=12112634@egNews&. The numbers are difficult 
to verify because there are no clear criteria for ‘modernity’ 
and it is not clear what the percentages refer to precisely. 
31 In February 2017, Minister of Defence Shoigu confirmed 
that an Information Warfare Directorate had been created at 
the Ministry of Defence in 2013 and announced it was estab-
lishing Information Operations Troops. “Ministr oborony 
Rossijskoj Federacii Sergej Shojgu vystupil” (see note 30). 
trast, economically weak states with no significant 
defence industries such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Mol-
dova and Armenia were barely able to maintain exist-
ing or acquire new military hardware. Only Azerbai-
jan and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan and Georgia 
were able to modernise their arsenals, in part through 
imports from abroad. After the collapse of the USSR, 
Ukraine inherited a third of the Soviet defence indus-
try, but until 2014 it produced primarily for export. 
Kiev also lost important armament sites from the an-
nexation of Crimea and fighting in the Donbas. Efforts 
at modernisation since 2014 have focused primarily 
on repairing and upgrading existing models, coupled 
with isolated arms imports from Western countries. 
The US government decided to deliver arms to Ukraine 
in December 2017. This is not yet a large-scale rearma-
ment programme, but Ukrainian forces are now being 
equipped with modern weapons in selected areas.32 
Also in terms of levels of personnel, professionali-
sation and training, the Russian forces are consider-
ably superior to other post-Soviet states. With 900,000 
troops, Russia’s military is more than four times the 
size of Ukraine’s, 13 times the size of Azerbaijan’s 
and 175 times the size of Moldova’s. Russia’s military 
reforms have also brought about a surge in profes-
sionalisation. While in 2008 Russia only had 76,000 
soldiers under contract (kontraktniki), by February 
2017 that figure had risen to 384,000.33 Overall, two-
thirds of Russia’s armed forces consist of professional 
and contract soldiers (220,000 officers and 384,000 
kontraktniki) and only one-third of conscripts (around 
 
32 These include rifles for snipers and anti-tank missiles. 
See Andrzej Wilk, The Best Army Ukraine Has Ever Had. Changes 
in Ukraine’s Armed Forces since the Russian Aggression, OSW 
Studies, no. 66 (Warsaw: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich 
[OSW], July 2017). 
33 In order to increase the number of soldiers that can be 
deployed rapidly on foreign missions, since November 2016 
kontraktniki have also been able to sign up for a short period 
of twelve months. In addition, since 2003, foreign citizens 
have been allowed to serve in the Russian armed forces on 
a contractual basis, and since October 2017 they have also 
been allowed to participate in military operations abroad. 
“Ministr oborony Rossijskoj Federacii Sergej Shojgu vystupil” 
(see note 30); “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ‘O vne-
senii izmenenij v Polozhenie o porjadke prochozhdenija 
voennoj sluzhby’” [Decree by the President of the Russian 
Federation: “On the Introduction of Amendments to Regu-
lations Governing Military Service”.], Oficialnyj internet-portal 
pravovoj informacii [Official Internet portal for legal informa-
tion], 8 October 2017, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/ 
Document/View/0001201710090001?index=0&rangeSize=1. 
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300,000). Professionalisation mainly benefited 
the rapidly deployable forces, which have also been 
strengthened in terms of personnel and materials. 
The number of airborne troops is expected to double 
to 72,000 by 2019.34 A peacekeeping unit completely 
made up of professional soldiers (5,000 men) was 
established in 2013.35 In the same year, the General 
Staff also created its own Special Operations Forces, 
members of which are deployed in Crimea and com-
bat operations in the Donbas and Syria.36 Thus, Russia 
has around 100,000 soldiers that can be deployed 
quickly for covert operations behind enemy lines, 
for counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency, crisis 
management and as a spearhead in conventional 
combat operations. 
 
34 Sergej Ptichkin, “Desant peresjadet na tanki” [Para-
troopers are Coming with Tanks], Rossijskaja Gazeta, 24 May 
2016, https://rg.ru/2016/05/24/vdv-poluchat-tiazheluiu-brone 
tehniku.html. 
35 Andrej Bondarenko, “Mirotvorcy v golubych beretach” 
[Peacekeepers in Blue Berets], Krasnaja Zvezda, 18 June 2013. 
36 See Aleksey Nikolsky, “Russian Special Operations 
Forces: Further Development or Stagnation?”, Moscow Defense 
Brief, no. 4 (2014): 25f. 
The general training levels of Russian soldiers have 
also improved significantly since the start of the mili-
tary reform. The number, scope and complexity of 
the exercises have increased considerably.37 Between 
2011 and 2014, the number of soldiers participating 
in major exercises has increased from 15,000 to 
150,000; the number of items of military hardware 
deployed has increased eightfold from 1,000 to 
8,000.38 The “East 2018” training exercise that took 
place in the “Eastern” and “Central” military districts 
 
37 In addition to an annual large-scale exercise which 
alternates between the various strategic directions (“West”, 
“Caucasus”, “Centre” and “East”), unannounced large-scale 
exercises (snap exercises) have been taking place again since 
2013. While the former tests various aspects of warfare, the 
latter tests the readiness of the armed forces. 
38 Based on data from Johan Norberg, Training to Fight. 
Russia’s Major Military Exercises 2011–2014, FOI-R--4128--SE 
(Stockholm: Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut [Swedish 
Defence Research Agency; FOI], December 2015). At the same 
time, the complexity of the scenarios tested continued to 
increase. Between 2014 and 2015, for example, there were 
30 percent more joint military exercises. IISS (ed.), The Mili-
tary Balance (see note 26), 187. 
Table 1 
Comparison of post-Soviet forces basis on selected parameters 
 Defence budget 2016  
in billions US dollars  
(purchasing power parity) 
No. of personnel Combat tanks Combat planes 
Russia 45.6 900,000  2,780  1,176 
Armenia  0.43  44,800  109  15 
Azerbaijan  1.6  66,950  439  37 
Belarus  0.5  45,350  532  64 
Georgia  0.3  20,650  123  3 
Kazakhstan  1.4  39,000  300  104 
Kyrgyzstan  n/a  10,900  150  4 
Moldova  0.03  5,150  0  0 
Tajikistan  0.2  7,500  37  0 
Turkmenistan  n/a  36,500  654  55 
Ukraine  2.7 204,000  832  125 
Uzbekistan  n/a  48,000  340  45 
Source: Own table based on data from IISS (ed.), The Military Balance. The Annual Assessment of Global Military 
Capabilities and Defence Economics (London, 2018): 181–215. 
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in September 2018 was the largest training exercise in 
post-Soviet times with officially 300,000 soldiers par-
ticipating.39 The training scenarios cover the entire 
range of deployment options in the post-Soviet space. 
Additionally, an increasing proportion of the armed 
forces have gained combat experience from opera-
tions in Ukraine and Syria. According to the Russian 
Defence Minister, 86 percent of Russian pilots have 
now completed flights in Syria.40 
Russian forces have the highest level of operational 
readiness in the post-Soviet space. In contrast, finan-
cially weak states such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Mol-
dova and Turkmenistan have hardly been able to 
invest in education, training or developing special 
forces for more than two decades. The situation looks 
somewhat better in resource-rich states, such as Azer-
baijan and Kazakhstan or in Georgia and Ukraine, 
where the wars with Russia have acted as a catalyst 
for modernisation.41 Since 2008, Tbilisi has been able 
to improve the training and education of its soldiers 
with the help of NATO and individual Western states, 
especially the US. In Ukraine, only 6,000 out of 
140,000 soldiers were ready for rapid deployment at 
the outbreak of fighting in 2014 due to a lack of 
training and poorly maintained materials. Since then, 
Kiev has not only almost doubled the size of its armed 
forces, but has also invested in modern command and 
control, training and a special forces unit. Today, 
Ukrainian soldiers also have the greatest operational 
experience in the post-Soviet space, after Russian 
forces.42 Nevertheless, Russia remains the only coun-
 
39 The real number of participating soldiers was presum-
ably lower since Russia’s military leadership tends to count 
military units in full strength and not the exact number of 
those soldiers that took part in the exercises. 
40 “Ministr oborony Rossijskoj Federacii Sergej Shojgu 
vystupil” (see note 30). 
41 Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, in particular, have increased 
training activities for their armed forces. Kazakh pilots now 
have similar training loads to Russian pilots with 100 hours’ 
training a year. Rashid Shirinov, “Azerbaijani Army Begins 
Large-scale Military Drills”, Azernews, 18 September 2017, 
https://www.azernews.az/nation/119127.html; IISS (ed.), The 
Military Balance (see note 26), 186. 
42 Since conscription was abolished in 2013, Ukraine had 
the highest level of formal professionalisation among post-
Soviet armed forces before the outbreak of war in 2014. 
However, the operational readiness of contract and profes-
sional soldiers was low due to lack of training and outdated 
equipment. After the beginning of the war, compulsory mili-
tary service was reintroduced and by the end of 2016, 90,000 
soldiers had been recruited. See Isabelle Facon, Reforming 
try in the region able to rapidly initiate, implement 
and sustain larger and more complex military opera-
tions.43 
Paramilitary forces and “proxies” 
In addition to its regular armed forces, Russia’s lead-
ers can also rely on paramilitary forces from other 
ministries for operations in the post-Soviet space. For 
instance, FSB special forces and the National Guard, 
formed in April 2016, are also available for anti-
terrorism operations. Units of the National Guard can 
also be placed under military command for territorial 
defence or used to maintain public order in an occu-
pation scenario.44 The Kadyrovtsy, some of whom 
fought in the Donbas and Syria, are formally attached 
to the National Guard but are de facto loyal to Che-
chen President Ramzan Kadyrov.45 In order to secure 
the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
which are recognised as independent by Russia, Mos-
cow also deploys border patrol troops.46 Coordinating 
missions involving not only regular armed forces 
but also paramilitary units from other ministries was 
made considerably easier in 2014. The then newly 
founded National Command Centre of the Ministry 
of Defence no longer only commands the various 
branches of the armed forces, but also the specific 
deployment of the armed units of more than 40 min-
istries and authorities.47 
 
Ukrainian Defense: No Shortage of Challenges, Notes de l’Ifri, 
Russie.Nei.Visions 101 (Paris: Institut français des relations 
internationales [IFRI], 2017). 
43 See Gudrun Persson (ed.), Russian Military Capability in a 
Ten-Year Perspective – 2016, FOI-R--4326--SE (Stockholm: FOI, 
December 2016). 
44 See Margarete Klein, Putin’s New National Guard. Bulwark 
against Mass Protests and Illoyal Elites, SWP Comment 41/2016 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2016). 
45 See Péter Marton and Annamária Kiss, “Review Article: 
Chechen Combatants’ Involvement as Foreign Fighters in 
Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq”, Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics 
and Society, no. 2 (2016): 189–220. 
46 Until 2004, Russia’s Border Service was also responsible 
for protecting the Tajik-Afghan border. 
47 See Roger McDermott, “Russia Activates New Defense 
Management Center”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 11, no. 196 
(4 November 2014), https://jamestown.org/program/russia-
activates-new-defense-management-center/. 
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‘Non-linear warfare’ is playing an 
increasingly important role. 
Beyond conventional missions, “non-linear war-
fare” or “hybrid warfare” is now playing an increas-
ingly important role in Russian military discourse on 
the post-Soviet space and in the Ukraine conflict. The 
unusual feature of “non-linear” wars is that they are 
not formally declared between states. Military and 
non-military instruments are closely coordinated and 
irregular ‘proxies’ are used alongside covert armed 
forces.48 They are not formally part of the armed 
forces or any other state paramilitary units, but are 
taking on de facto military auxiliary or combat tasks 
and are unofficially supported by the army, for 
example with training or supplies.49 This approach 
gives Russia’s leaders a dual advantage: Externally, 
they can distance themselves from non-state forces 
through ‘plausible deniability’ and inwardly contain 
the politically sensitive topic of ‘fallen soldiers’. At 
the end of 2015, President Putin claimed there were 
no regular Russian troops in the Donbas; at the same 
time, he “never said there weren’t people who carried 
out certain tasks, including military ones”.50 
 
48 Before 2014, in Russian military circles, the debate was 
on ‘nonlinear warfare or ‘new generation warfare’. Only in 
the course of the Western debate on ‘hybrid warfare’ was 
this term (gibridnaja voijna) also discussed in Russia, but it 
was mostly rejected as a Western concept. In Western dis-
course, the term quickly spread from 2014. In the meantime, 
however, its analytical content and political impact are also 
viewed much more critically in the West. On the Russian 
debate, see Gerasimov, “Cennost’ nauki” (see note 22); Belskij 
and Klimenko, “Politicheskie technologii cvetnych revolucij” 
(see note 23); Vorobjev and Kitselev, “Strategii sokrushenija i 
izmora v novom oblike” (see note 23); Aleksandr Bartosh, 
“Rossii ne izbezhat gibridnych vojn” [Russia cannot escape 
hybrid wars], Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 9 March 2018, 
http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2018-03-09/1_987_hybridwar.html. 
On the Western debate, see Andrew Monaghan, “The ‘War’ 
in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’”, Parameters 45, no. 4 (Winter 
2015–16): 65–74; Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, Russia 
and Hybrid Warfare. Going beyond the Label, Aleksanteri Papers 
no. 1/2016 (Helsinki, 2016). 
49 See Aleksandr Gostev and Robert Coalson, “Russia’s 
Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge from the Shadows”, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 December 2016, https://www. 
rferl.org/a/russia-paramilitary-mercenaries-emerge-from-the-
shadows-syria-ukraine/28180321.html. 
50 “Bolshaja Press-Konferencija Vladimira Putina” [Major 
Press Conference by Vladimir Putin], Prezident Rossii [President 
These proxies include volunteer fighters from 
Russia, local forces from post-Soviet countries and 
mercenaries. In Russia, paramilitary education is pro-
moted by the state – both in and out of school, for 
example, by the Volunteer Society for Cooperation 
with the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF), veteran 
organisations and nationalist groups.51 According to 
media reports, non-governmental Internet platforms 
played a role in recruiting volunteer fighters for 
Ukraine, as did military draft offices that tracked 
down former Afghan, Chechnya and Georgia military 
personnel. Quite a few of the Donbas fighters from 
Russia once served in the Russian armed forces or 
security forces.52 
Russian Cossacks can be found at the interface of 
state and non-state actors. There are around 500,000 
registered Cossacks officially serving as auxiliary 
policemen, border guards and special army units in 
Russia. There are also Cossack associations that are 
not registered with the state.53 Numerous members 
of both groups live in the regions on the borders of 
Ukraine, the South Caucasus and Kazakhstan and are, 
therefore, perfectly placed to act as proxies there. 
Russian Cossacks fought in Transnistria, Chechnya, 
Georgia and Ukraine. In the Donbas, they were mainly 
involved in capturing border towns.54 Moscow ben-
efits from the fact that Russian Cossack associations 
have close ties with Cossack groups in other post-
Soviet countries. Moscow not only fosters these links, 
 
of Russia] (official website), 17 December 2015, http:// 
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971. 
51 See Sam Robertshaw, “Voluntary Organizations and 
Society-Military Relations in Contemporary Russia”, European 
Security 24, no. 2 (2015): 304–18; Orysia Lutsevych, Agents of 
the Russian World. Proxy Groups in the Contested Neighbourhood 
(London: Chatham House, April 2016), 31. 
52 Nikolay Mitrochin, “Diktaturtransfer im Donbass. 
Gewalt und ‘Staatsbildung’ in Russlands ‘Volksrepubliken’”, 
Osteuropa 67, no. 3–4 (2017): 41–55 (49). 
53 Cossacks played an important role in protecting and 
expanding the territory of the Russian Empire as soldier 
peasants. While some Cossacks strive to be recognised as an 
independent ethnic group, most see themselves as ethnic 
Russians with their own specifically military culture. See 
Jolanta Darczewska, Putin’s Cossacks. Folklore, Business or Poli-
tics?, OSW Point of View no. 68 (Warsaw: OSW, December 
2017), 23ff. 
54 See Valery Dzutsati, “Terek Cossacks Reveal Their Ex-
tensive Participation in the Annexation of Crimea”, Eurasia 
Daily Monitor 13, no. 191 (6 December 2016), https:// 
jamestown.org/program/terek-cossacks-reveal-extensive-
participation-annexation-crimea/. 
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but actively supports Cossack groups in post-Soviet 
countries. For example, before annexation, Crimean 
Cossacks received financial support from Russia and 
in March 2014 they helped occupy administrative 
buildings. In Belarus, which has hardly any Cossack 
tradition of its own, Moscow is promoting the devel-
opment of such groups, for example by providing 
training in Russian military camps.55 
Other local proxies include former Russian soldiers 
and intelligence agents who have moved to post-
Soviet countries, as well as (former) local security and 
military personnel. So some of the militia leaders in 
the Donbas once served in the armed organs of Rus-
sia. Crimea’s annexation was also made easier by the 
defection of high-ranking Ukrainian military to the 
Russian armed forces, including a naval commander 
and the deputy commander of the Ukrainian Black 
Sea Fleet. 
The advantage to Moscow of using Russian and 
non-Russian ‘volunteers’ is that it makes military 
actions look like local uprisings. However, they 
sometimes proved to be difficult to control and not 
very effective militarily. As a result, since 2015, 
Russian leaders have undergone a learning process. 
They are now relying increasingly on mercenaries 
who give them greater professionalisation and con-
trol. Although private military companies are still 
prohibited under Russian law, Russia’s leaders can 
commission private security companies that are 
equipped like private military firms, or use the ser-
vices of mercenary groups led by former Russian 
military or intelligence agents and registered abroad, 
such as “Vagner”, “RBS” or “Slavjanskij Korpus”.56 If 
 
55 Kamil Kłysiński and Piotr Żochowski, The End of the Myth 
of a Brotherly Belarus? Russian Soft Power in Belarus after 2014: 
The Background and Its Manifestations, OSW Studies, no. 58 
(Warsaw: OSW, November 2016), 31f. 
56 In April 2012, Putin announced that private military 
firms could be “a way to implement national interests with-
out direct state involvement”. As a result, a bill to legalise 
private military firms was put before the Duma, but has not 
yet been adopted. Aleksey Nikolsky, “Legalization of Private 
Military Companies in Russia: What Is Holding It Back?”, 
Moscow Defense Brief, no. 2 (2015): 26; Niklas Eklund and 
Jörgen Elfving, “Russian Private Military Companies – Red-
water?”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, no. 39 (22 March 2017), 
https://jamestown.org/program/russian-private-military-
companies-redwater/. “Chastnaja armija pod krylom Mino-
borony” [Private military companies under the umbrella of 
the Ministry of Defence], Fontanka, 21 August 2017, https:// 
www.fontanka.ru/2017/08/18/106/. 
they act too independently or are militarily ineffec-
tive then Russia can quickly distance itself from them 
again. 
Deployability and forward presence 
Fast deployability and forward presence are key 
elements of power projection. In the course of the 
military reform, the ability to move personnel and 
material both within and beyond their own territory 
was significantly improved.57 Different transport 
methods are needed, depending on the deployment 
location. Transportation by road and rail is still criti-
cal for those countries with which Russia has a joint 
land border (Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan). One advantage for Moscow is that rail 
traffic in post-Soviet countries continues to be based 
on the Russian gauge. This simplifies transport in the 
region for Russia. 
By contrast, military operations in those countries 
surrounded by land and with no joint border with 
Russia, namely Moldova, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan and Uzbekistan, depend on air lift. Also, sea lift 
would be needed for operations in Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Certainly Russia’s 
armed forces have by far the largest fleet of transport 
aircraft and ships in the region and its military opera-
tion in Syria demonstrates that Russia has overcome 
its traditional dependence on ground transport and is 
now in a position to ensure limited deployment even 
over several thousand kilometres. At the same time, 
however, the Syria operation is tying up a significant 
portion of its air and sea-lift capabilities. For this 
reason, it is questionable as to what extent Moscow 
could simultaneously carry out a large-scale deploy-
ment in one of the countries that cannot be reached 
by land – even more so if there are no Russian mili-
tary bases there. Operations in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan would also depend on Kazakhstan 
permitting the necessary air transport to fly over its 
territory. 
 
57 Defence Minister Shoigu said these snap exercises were 
to train deploying 65,000 troops over 3,000 kilometres with-
in 72 hours. Dave Johnson, Russia’s Approach to Conflict – Im-
plications for NATO’s Deterrence and Defence, NATO Research 
Paper no. 111 (Rome: NATO Defense College, Research Divi-
sion, April 2015), 3. 
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Moscow’s ability to project power in 
the post-Soviet space is enhanced by 
having its own military bases there. 
Moscow’s ability to project power in the post-Soviet 
space is enhanced by the presence of its own military 
bases. Russia maintains military bases in Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Armenia, who agree to host them as a 
means to enhance the security that these countries 
feel unable to provide without external support. In 
Armenia, the presence of Russian troops to protect 
against possible aggression from Azerbaijan and 
Turkey is welcomed and, therefore, not challenged 
by the new leadership under Prime Minister Nikol 
Pashinyan, who formed a new government after the 
Velvet Revolution in May 2018. The leaders of Tajiki-
stan and Kyrgyzstan also value the Russian military 
presence as important support in the fight against 
transnational dangers, potential civil unrest or nega-
tive spillover effects from Afghanistan. Furthermore, 
they see it as a way to balance China’s growing eco-
nomic and political influence in the military arena. 
Kyrgyzstan, for example, is asking Moscow to estab-
lish a second Russian base (under the CSTO banner) 
in the south of the country near the border with Af-
ghanistan. In contrast, Russian troops in Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea (since 2014) are 
stationed there against the will of the host country.58 
Whether or not a host country approves the pres-
ence of Russian troops, it can be used to exert politico-
military pressure on the respective country and 
conduct military operations in and from that country 
faster and more effectively. The vulnerabilities asso-
ciated with a Russian military presence were evident 
in Georgia as well as in the annexation of Crimea. 
Certainly, the shelling of the Russian peacekeeping 
contingent in South Ossetia by Georgian troops gave 
Russia the excuse to mount a military intervention. 
However, Moscow had already massively strength-
 
58 A 1997 agreement allowed Russia to station its Black 
Sea fleet in Crimea until 2017. In 2010, the agreement was 
extended and, therefore, the Russian military presence until 
2042. Russia announced the extension after Crimea’s an-
nexation. At the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999, Russia 
agreed to withdraw its troops from Transnistria and to 
reduce its troop presence in Georgia, as well as to come to 
an agreement with Tbilisi on the modalities of the Russian 
military presence in the country. After the Georgia war in 
2008, Moscow recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
independent states and negotiated with them, bypassing 
Georgia’s contracts on troop deployments. 
ened the number of troops it had stationed in Abkha-
zia as peacekeepers under the banner of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) and, in 2008, 
it was able to use its military presence there to pen-
etrate deep into Georgian heartland. The threatening 
presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet also played a 
crucial role in the annexation of Crimea. 
Regional priorities 
Over the last decade, Moscow has succeeded in ex-
panding the unilateral power projection capabilities 
of its armed forces in the post-Soviet space. Latest 
since the Ukraine conflict, there has been a clear shift 
of emphasis towards the western post-Soviet space, 
while the extended activities it has undertaken in the 
Caucasus since 2008 continue. By contrast, its mili-
tary presence in Central Asia, which initially gained 
in importance in the wake of the Afghanistan prob-
lem after 2001, is stagnating. 
The most significant changes relate to Ukraine. 
With the annexation of Crimea, the existing base of 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet became an integrated part 
of its strategic-operational command “South”. The 
number of Russian soldiers stationed on the peninsula 
increased from 13,000 in 2013 to 28,000 in 2016 and 
is expected to grow to 45,000 by 2025.59 The bilateral 
deployment agreement of 1997 had placed severe 
limitations on Russia’s ability to modernise its Black 
Sea Fleet. But now, with the help of new submarines 
and frigates equipped with modern cruise missiles 
(Kalibr), as well as modern coastal and air defence sys-
tems, it has been able to strengthen its anti-access/ 
area denial capabilities60 over the peninsula and 
the adjacent region.61 This not only serves to deter 
Ukraine from attempting to recapture the area, but 
also consolidates Russia’s military position in the 
Black Sea, also vis-à-vis its NATO neighbours. Al-
 
59 See Ridvan Bari Urcosta and Lev Abalkin, “Crimea: 
Russia’s Stronghold in the Black Sea”, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1 September 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/ 
article/essay_crimea_ russias_stronghold_in_the_black_sea. 
60 With A2/AD capabilities, states seek to deny other actors 
access to, or scope for, military action in a given area. To 
achieve this, they mainly use air defence systems and pre-
cision weapons. 
61 See Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia Pours More Military 
Hardware into ‘Fortress Crimea’”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, 
no. 147 (14 November 2017), https://jamestown.org/program/ 
russia-pours-military-hardware-fortress-crimea/. 
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though this is officially denied, research by investiga-
tive journalists from Russia and Ukraine shows that 
Russian soldiers – in different strengths at different 
times – are covertly deployed in the Donbas.62 Since 
2014, Moscow has also massively strengthened its 
military presence along the entire land border with 
Ukraine by permanently relocating existing army 
units there or re-establishing large units that were 
formerly disbanded.63 This approach not only main-
tains a constant threat to Kiev, but also allows Russia 
to rapidly intervene in the event of renewed escala-
tion. There is increasing potential for military con-
frontation over the Sea of Azov since the bridge over 
of the Strait of Kerch, which was inaugurated in May 
2018, connects Crimea with the Russian mainland. 
Kiev is concerned that Russia will limit access to the 
Sea of Azov for Ukrainian ships in order to harm the 
Ukrainian harbours in the Sea of Azov economically 
and, as a result, undermine the political cohesion of 
Ukraine.64 Not only has Russia further secured the 
annexation of Crimea and the supply of pro-Russian 
 
62 Russian newspapers and TV stations critical of the gov-
ernment (e.g. Novaja Gazeta and Dozhd) and Ukrainian inves-
tigative journalists (e.g. the research collective InformNapalm) 
provide evidence of the covert use of Russian soldiers in the 
Donbas, including tracking the origin of Russian fighters 
from regular military units killed or captured there. From 
open sources, however, it is not possible to determine a 
reliable total number of Russian soldiers deployed in the 
Donbas. According to Igor Sutiagin, a Russian military 
researcher working in the UK, up to 10,000 Russian soldiers 
were there at the height of fighting during the Battles of 
Ilovajsk and Debaltseve. Igor Sutjagin, Russian Forces in 
Ukraine, RUSI Briefing Papers (London: Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence Studies [RUSI], 9 March 2015), https:// 
rusi.org/publication/briefing-papers/russian-forces-ukraine; 
Nikolay Mitrokhin, “Infiltration, Instruktion, Invasion. Russ-
lands Krieg in der Ukraine”, Osteuropa 64, no. 8 (2014): 3–16. 
63 In 2015, the headquarters of the 20th Army belonging 
to the military district “West” was transferred from Nizhni 
Novgorod to Voronesh on the border with Ukraine. At the 
same time, this army received two new divisions, the 3rd 
and 144th divisions, which were stationed near the border 
with Ukraine (Rostov) and Belarus (Belgorod). The 8th Army 
was re-established in the military district “South”. The 150th 
division, which is assigned to it, is stationed on the southern 
border with Ukraine near Rostov. 
64 Maryna Vorotnyuk, “In Serious Escalation, Russia 
Openly Attacks Ukrainian Vessels in Azov SeaEurasia Daily 
Monitor 15, no. 165 (26 November 2018), https://jamestown. 
org/program/in-serious-escalation-russia-openly-attacks-
ukrainian-vessels-in-azov-sea/. 
forces in the Donbas, but it has also expanded its 
overall capabilities to militarily underpin political 
demands against Ukraine. 
The conflict over Ukraine and Russian-Western 
tensions also affected Russia’s military position in 
the rest of the Western post-Soviet space. In 2013, 
Moscow sought permission to build an air base on 
Belarusian territory. To date, Russia has no military 
bases there. Such a base would have improved both 
its forward presence vis-à-vis NATO and also given 
the Kremlin military leverage in case the Belarusian 
leadership moved too close to the EU. The Russian 
leadership justified its call by the inadequate capacity 
of the Belarusian Air Force to fulfil its obligations 
under the planned joint air defence system. However, 
Moscow itself had brought about this condition by 
refusing to supply Minsk with modern fighter jets for 
years. President Lukashenko, probably sensitised by 
the experience of the Ukraine crisis, rejected Russia’s 
request in 2015. Minsk was aware of its more favour-
able negotiating position against the background of 
the significant deterioration in Russian-Western rela-
tions. In order not to strain relations with Belarus, 
Moscow decided not to touch upon this contentious 
issue for some time. Yet Russia renewed its demand 
for a military base in Belarus while drafting the new 
Military Doctrine of the Union State of Russia and 
Belarus in autumn 2018. Nevertheless, Moscow was 
unable to force Belarus to include provisions into the 
military doctrine for establishing a Russian military 
base in Belarus. This hints at the limits of Russian 
influence even over its close allies. At the same time, 
the Russian armed forces established a new division 
on the border with Belarus and reinforced their air 
defences and air force in the Kaliningrad exclave. 
Both steps are aimed primarily at Ukraine and NATO, 
but also strengthen Russia’s position vis-à-vis Belarus 
because of the proximity of their forces to the 
border.65 
 
65 Russia has been modernising and strengthening its 
armed forces in Kaliningrad since 2008. After the outbreak 
of the Ukraine crisis, the focus was mainly on expanding the 
A2/AD systems. In contrast, the offensive capabilities of the 
army units stationed there are poor. Here, the new division 
set up near Belgorod plays a greater role. See Fredrik Wester-
lund, Russia’s Military Strategy and Force Structure in Kaliningrad, 
RUFS Briefing no. 40 (Stockholm: FOI, May 2017); Aleksandr 
Alesein, “Udarnye samolety: oni uleteli, no mogut ver-
nut’sja” [Combat aircraft: they fly off, but can also return], 
Belrynok, 17 January 2018, http://www.belrynok.by/2018/01/ 
17/udarnye-samolety-oni-uleteli-no-mogut-vernutsya/; Arseny 
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While Moscow expanded its power projection 
capabilities vis-à-vis Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, 
Belarus, the Ukrainian conflict exposed the vulner-
ability of Russia’s military presence in Transnistria. 
After all, the 1,500 Russian soldiers stationed there 
can only be supplied or reinforced via Ukrainian 
territory.66 In May 2015, Kiev suspended the agree-
ment on land transport, so Russian troops have since 
had to be supplied exclusively by air.67 This reduces 
Moscow’s ability to use the military base in Transnis-
tria for potential offensive actions in Moldova or 
against Ukraine and open up a second front in west-
ern Ukraine – as was feared in the spring of 2014. 
The task of the soldiers stationed in Transnistria, 
therefore, remains limited to securing Moscow’s 
position in the Transnistria conflict. 
Russia’s military build-up in the West 
has received a significant boost in the 
wake of the Ukraine crisis. 
Russia’s military build-up in the West has received 
a significant boost in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. 
A similar process, albeit to a lesser extent, had already 
begun in the Caucasus after the Russo-Georgian War 
in 2008. For a long time, Russian troops stationed in 
the strategic operational command “South” were 
given preference with regard to modern hardware 
and to professionalisation and training; their forward 
presence was also expanded. Whereas before August 
2008 there were only 1,000 Russian soldiers in Ab-
khazia and South Ossetia, around 3,500 soldiers and 
1,500 FSB border guards have been stationed in each 
of the entities since. Now, every seventh inhabitant 
 
Sivistky, “New Union State Military Doctrine Will Not 
Change Status Quo in Belarusian-Russian Military Alliance”, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 174 (11 December 2018), https:// 
jamestown.org/program/new-union-state-military-doctrine-
will-not-change-status-quo-in-belarusian-russian-military-
alliance/. 
66 Of the 1,500 Russian soldiers in Transnistria, around 
500 belong to the trilateral peacekeeping forces, while, 
according to official figures, the remaining 1,000 soldiers 
guard an ammunitions dump. In 1999, Moscow agreed to 
withdraw its guards by 2003. They have been there since 
without Moldova’s consent. 
67 Russia now mainly supplies its soldiers via Tiraspol air-
port. See Vladimir Frolov, “Will the Transdnestr Crisis Force 
Russia into War?”, The Moscow Times, 7 June 2015, https:// 
themoscowtimes.com/articles/will-the-transdnestr-crisis-
force-russia-into-war-47197. 
of South Ossetia and every twentieth inhabitant of 
Abkhazia is a member of one of Russia’s armed forces 
or border guards. Georgia’s leaders are confronted 
by Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that 
are one third the size of the entire Georgian armed 
forces, and can be quickly reinforced with more units 
from across the northern border. 
After the Russo-Georgian war, Moscow stepped up 
training activities for the 3,300 soldiers stationed in 
Armenia and upgraded their weapons.68 Its arsenal 
at the military base there is qualitatively and, in part, 
quantitatively superior to that of the Armenian armed 
forces, and the presence of its troops there also serves 
to reaffirm the close Russian-Armenian military 
alliance and to ensure that Yerevan is not moving too 
close to the EU. However, given Yerevan’s depend-
ence on military protection from Moscow, there are 
very narrow limits to Armenia’s multi-vectoral for-
eign policy anyway. Even the new Prime Minister, 
Nikol Paschinyan, who in April 2018 forced the then 
Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan to resign after mass 
protests, did not question the alliance with Moscow. 
Russia’s power projection capabilities vis-à-vis 
Azerbaijan are significantly weaker than those in 
relation to Armenia and Georgia. It is the only South 
Caucasian country where Moscow has no military 
base. In addition, unlike Georgia and Armenia, 
resource-rich Azerbaijan has invested large sums in 
modernising its arsenal in recent years. 
While Russia was and is significantly expanding 
its forward presence to the West and the South Cau-
casus, it is now stagnating in Central Asia. On the one 
hand, Moscow also managed to extend its right to use 
the bases here: until 2032 for the air base in Kyrgyz 
Kant, formally under the CSTO banner, with 500 
soldiers and up to 2042 for the base in Tajikistan with 
5,000 soldiers. Moscow is modernising the weapons 
and equipment of its troops stationed there, too, and 
is aiming for permanent use of the air base in Ajni, 
Tajikistan.69 At the same time, however, Russia is  
 
68 See Armen Grigoryan, “Russia Increases Military 
Capacity in the South Caucasus”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 12, 
no. 61 (2 April 2015), https://jamestown.org/program/russia-
increases-military-capacity-in-the-south-caucasus/. 
69 See John C. K. Daly, “Russia to Double Aircraft at Kant 
Airfield in Kyrgyzstan”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 10, no. 204 
(13 November 2013), https://jamestown.org/program/russia-to-
double-air craft-at-kant-airfield-in-kyrgyzstan/; “Operational 
Group of Russian Forces in Tajikistan”, GlobalSecurity.org, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ogrv-
tajikistan.htm. 
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cautious about Kyrgyzstan’s offer to build a second 
base there.70 Furthermore, in February 2016, it not 
only reversed plans to increase troop numbers in 
Tajikistan and extend them to division strength 
(9,000 troops), but even announced a decrease to 
brigade strength (3,000–5,000 troops).71 This reflects 
the general shift of military priorities towards the 
West as well as Russia’s limited financial and ma-
terial resources in the face of two parallel military 
operations. 
Given the weakness of the Tajikistani and Kyrgyz 
armed forces, Moscow still has a strong military posi-
 
70 “Atambaev. Rossija ne budet pretendovat’ na territoriju 
Kirgizii” [Russia will not aspire to annex Kyrgyz territory], 
Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 24 July 2017, http://www.ng.ru/news/ 
588371.html. 
71 In April 2015, the commander of the 201st military base 
announced that 9,000 soldiers would be added to the units 
stationed there. In February 2016, however, the commander 
of the “Centre” military district announced that the base 
would be reduced to brigade size. “Operational Group of 
Russian Forces in Tajikistan” (see note 69). 
tion in both countries and could carry out limited 
operations there and from there, for example to 
counter terrorism or local uprisings. In the event of 
a broader destabilisation, however, Russian forces 
on the ground would need reinforcements and, there-
fore, permission from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan or 
Uzbekistan for transports through or over their ter-
ritory. Moscow does not have any of its own military 
bases in these three countries. Moreover, neither 
in Turkmenistan nor Uzbekistan can Russia rely on 
strong proxies, that is, Russian minorities or Cossack 
groups. As a result, Russia would not be able to build 
much military pressure on either country in case of a 
conflict. In the event of a crisis with Kazakhstan, 
Russia could exert pressure by concentrating troops 
on the land border and trying to mobilise Cossack 
associations and pro-Russian forces among the Rus-
sian minority in the north of the country. However, a 
conventional military operation would be a high-risk 
strategy given the size of the territory and its own 
military presence in the country. 
Table 2 
Russia’s military bases in the post-Soviet space (2018) 
Country Description Number of stationed 
Russian soldiers 
Approval of 
host country 
Contractually 
guaranteed 
duration of use 
Armenia 202nd military base  3,300 yes 2044 
Georgia 
(South Ossetia) 
4th military base 3,500 soldiers 
1,500 border guards 
no 2059 
Georgia 
(Abkhazia) 
7th Military base 
Air force and air defence 
naval base 
3,500 soldiers 
1,500 border guards 
no 2059 
Kyrgyzstan Air force base under 
CSTO banner 
500 yes 2032 
Moldova 
(Transnistria) 
 1,500 soldiers 
(including around 
500 peacekeepers) 
no 2002 
Tajikistan 201st military base 5,000 yes 2042 
Ukraine Black Sea Fleet (Crimea) 28,000 no  
Source: Own table based on data from IISS (ed.), The Military Balance. The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and 
Defence Economics (London, 2018), 224. Furthermore, Russia has military facilities in Belarus (a radar station and a naval 
communication facility) and in Kazakhstan (a radar facility). However, since these are not military bases, they are not 
listed in the table. 
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In addition to expanding its unilateral power projec-
tion capabilities, the second pillar of Russia’s military 
policy in the post-Soviet space is bilateral coopera-
tion. This ranges from cooperation on weapons, edu-
cation and training to partial functional integration. 
The motivation of post-Soviet countries to cooperate 
militarily with Moscow ranges from the expectation 
of material benefits and the desire to balance the 
influence of other actors, to safeguarding vital secu-
rity interests that only protection from Russia can 
ensure. Moscow itself sees the cooperation as a way of 
dealing more effectively with regional threats. At the 
same time, it targets close security links that create 
one-sided dependencies and the potential to exert its 
influence. Moscow is also willing to bear substantial 
costs to achieve this. 
Armaments cooperation 
Since the early 1990s, Russian leaders have promoted 
defence technology cooperation with the post-Soviet 
countries through the sale, purchase and joint pro-
duction of weapons and equipment. Moscow benefits 
from the fact that, after the breakup of the USSR, three 
quarters of the Soviet defence industry remained 
in Russia. In addition, only Ukraine retained a share 
(14 percent) that allowed them to independently 
manufacture weapons.72 All the remaining countries 
rely on arms imports. 
Moscow’s willingness to sacrifice economic benefits 
demonstrates how it uses arms exports as an instru-
ment to maintain security ties. For example, Russia 
rewards its CSTO allies with price reductions.73 It also 
 
72 Most of the defence companies remaining in Belarus 
and Kazakhstan only produce individual components and 
not entire weapons systems. Julian Cooper, The Soviet Defense 
Industry: Conversion and Economic Reform (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Press for the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1991), 21. 
73 Robert Śmigielski, The Role of Arms Exports in the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation, Bulletin no. 54 (Warsaw: The 
promotes the sale of Russian weapons with bonds. If 
it is in its military interest, Moscow will also provide 
military equipment free of charge to alliance part-
ners. For example, it provided air defence systems 
(S-300) to Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to create 
a joint air defence network. As a result, Russia was 
able to secure a dominant role as an arms supplier to 
CSTO members. Between 2000 and 2016, it accounted 
for 95 percent of all arms imports from Tajikistan, 
93 percent from Belarus, 81 percent from Armenia, 
79 percent from Kazakhstan and 78 percent from 
Kyrgyzstan.74 
Moscow uses these dependencies to consolidate its 
military position in the respective countries. It offered 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia a generous pack-
age deal of arms shipments. In return, these countries 
agreed to extend Russia’s right to use military bases 
in their territories by more than two decades. Sub-
sidised arms imports are the only way to modernise 
their armed forces, especially for the financially weak 
countries. The more precarious the security situations 
of countries such as Armenia and Tajikistan become, 
the greater their dependence on Russia. 
In contrast, Russia can barely exert any political 
pressure through arms exports on those post-Soviet 
countries that have diversified their imports or largely 
replaced Russia as a supplier. Between 2000 and 2016, 
the share of Russian military equipment in Azer-
baijan’s armed forces was 61 percent, 31 percent in 
Turkmenistan’s and 10 percent in Uzbekistan’s.75 
These countries import armaments from Ukraine, 
Israel, Turkey, Western countries and, for the first 
time in recent years, from China.76 In order to remain 
a weapons supplier to the three countries concerned, 
Russia is prepared to make economic concessions. For 
 
Polish Institute of International Affairs, 9 April 2010), https:// 
www.files.ethz.ch/isn/116269/a130-2010.pdf. 
74 Own calculation based on data from the SIPRI Arms 
Transfer Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/ 
armstransfers. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
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example, in November 2016, it wrote off historic 
debts of $800 million owed by Uzbekistan and prom-
ised to continue to supply the country with discounted 
military supplies, despite its withdrawal from CSTO, 
in the hope of “more active cooperation” on training 
and exercises.77 The armaments cooperation with 
Georgia (since 2008) and Ukraine (since 2014) has 
been completely discontinued. As a result of Russian 
military interventions, these countries have amended 
their import policies and now source weapons and 
equipment mainly from Turkey and Western coun-
tries.78 
The Ukraine crisis also revealed vulnerabilities 
in the Russian defence industry. Between 2009 and 
2013, 87 percent of Russian arms imports came from 
Ukraine.79 Moscow has been trying to reduce its 
dependence on Ukrainian and Belarusian suppliers 
in this sensitive area since the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
at the beginning of the conflict, Russia did not have 
any other source for around 30 percent of military 
equipment previously imported from Ukraine. This 
mainly affected turbines for ships, aircraft and heli-
copters as well as individual components for inter-
continental missiles.80 This resulted in delays to in-
dividual modernisation programmes for the Russian 
armed forces.81 
Training cooperation 
Russian leaders also use support for training activities 
to provide a further incentive for post-Soviet coun-
tries to commit to Russia. This allows it to focus on 
pro-Russian viewpoints, for example in terms of 
threat perception or the role of Russia in the region, 
 
77 Fozil Mashrab, “Uzbekistan Turns to Russia in Search 
of Modern Weapons”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, no. 19 (15 Feb-
ruary 2017), https://jamestown.org/program/uzbekistan-turns-
russia-search-modern-weapons/. 
78 SIPRI has no information about Moldovan arms imports. 
79 Tomas Malmlöf, “A Case Study of Russo-Ukrainian De-
fense Industrial Cooperation: Russian Dilemmas”, The Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 1 (2016): 1–22. 
80 Ibid., 15. 
81 At the same time, Russia’s defence industry gained 
capacity from the annexation of Crimea and the de facto 
occupation of Donbas. Andrey Frolov, “Russian in Place of 
Foreign. Import Substitution in Russia’s Military-Industrial 
Complex: The Experience of 2014–2016”, Russia in Global 
Affairs, 13 February 2017, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/ 
Russian-in-Place-of-Foreign-18590. 
and to strengthen interoperability. Here, too, coopera-
tion is promoted by Soviet-era connections. These 
include Russian language skills or the heritage of a 
joint military culture. Since the post-Soviet states, 
with the exception of Russia, did not have their own 
military academies at the beginning of their inde-
pendence, they were dependent on Russian support 
during the transition period. In the 1990s, military 
teaching staff from Russia helped shape the develop-
ment of new national military academies. Further-
more, subsidised training for their high-ranking 
military cadres in Russia remains attractive to this 
day, especially for financially weak countries. 
Training cooperation with CSTO members is par-
ticularly close. As allies they receive fixed quotas of 
training places for officers.82 Particularly the poorer 
member states of Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
often have as many officers being trained in Russia as 
they do in their own countries, or even more.83 Russia 
maintained a particularly intensive training coopera-
tion with Belarus. However, Minsk has been more re-
luctant since the Ukraine crisis. In 2012, 600 Belaru-
sian soldiers were sent on officer training courses in 
Russia, but that number had fallen to 374 by 2015.84 
Far fewer military personnel from Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan receive military training 
in Russia. For example, between 1992 and 2009, only 
250 Uzbek officers took part in Russian military 
academy courses. After the country left the CSTO in 
2012, training cooperation was interrupted and for-
mally resumed in 2016 as part of the new bilateral 
 
82 There are no complete data series on how many officers 
from each CSTO member were actually sent to Russia each 
year for training. 
83 According to CSTO data, 250 Armenian officers studied 
at Russian military colleges in 2014, compared with 203 in 
2016. The number of graduates from Armenian military 
colleges is similar. In Tajikistan, the majority of officers are 
trained in Russia. Emil Danielyan, “Russia to Boost Military 
Training for Armenia”, Radio Azatutyun (Armenian-language 
service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), 9 September 
2016, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/27977627.html; Dmitry 
Gorenburg, External Support for Central Asian Military and Secu-
rity Forces, Working Paper (Solna: SIPRI, January 2014), 44f. 
84 By comparison, 800 Belarusian soldiers were trained in 
their own country in 2012. Siarhei Bohdan, “Belarus-Russia 
Military Cooperation: Can the Kremlin Dictate the Terms?”, 
Belarus Digest, 26 November 2015, https://belarusdigest.com/ 
story/belarus-russia-military-cooperation-can-the-kremlin-
dictate-the-terms/; Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, Support as a 
Means of Subordination. Russia’s Policy on Belarus, OSW Point of 
View no. 34 (Warsaw: OSW, May 2013), 30. 
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rapprochement between Russia and Uzbekistan.85 
There is no longer any training cooperation with 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Ukrainian leaders 
have also been working to remove pro-Russian sol-
diers and officers from the armed forces since 2014.86 
Joint exercises 
Bilateral exercises not only promote interoperability, 
but also provide important insights into the state 
of the partner countries’ armed forces.87 The Ukraine 
crisis exposed the concomitant vulnerabilities. The 
Russian and Ukrainian Black Sea Fleets had regularly 
conducted joint manoeuvres (Farvater Mira) since 
1997. These are also likely to have provided Russia 
with insights into specific vulnerabilities of Ukrainian 
armed forces deployed in Crimea. 
Some CSTO members are now 
showing more autonomy. 
As with armaments and training cooperation, the 
degree of cooperation between post-Soviet states and 
Russia is quite diverse on joint exercises. Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Moldova, Georgia and, since 2014, 
Ukraine are not engaged in any bilateral manoeuvres. 
The same was true of Uzbekistan for a long time, 
until in 2017, for the first time in twelve years, it held 
a joint manoeuvre with Russia again.88 
Russia’s cooperation with its allies in the CSTO on 
joint exercises is also the most advanced. The num-
ber, extent and complexity of bilateral exercises have 
increased significantly since 2008.89 This is partly due 
 
85 Vladimir Paramonov and Oleg Stolpovsski, Russia and 
Central Asia: Bilateral Cooperation in the Defence Sector (London, 
2008), 13. 
86 “Ukraine’s Defense Minister: 40% of Ministry’s Officials 
Fail Polygraph Tests”, Unian, 25 April 2016, https://www. 
unian.info/politics/1328824-ukraines-defense-minister-40-of-
minis trys-officials-fail-polygraph-tests.html. 
87 In addition, Russian troops are training in the CSTO’s 
multilateral framework with its post-Soviet allies. Dies wird 
im folgenden Kapitel behandelt. 
88 “Uzbekistan, Russia to Expand Military and Technical 
Cooperation”, gazeta.uz, 30 November 2016, https://www. 
gazeta.uz/en/2016/11/30/mil/. 
89 See list of Russian exercises with external partners on 
the official website of the Russian Ministry of Defence, http:// 
eng.mil.ru/en/mission/practice/all.htm?objInBlock=10&f=31&
blk=10564892. 
to Russia itself having massively expanded its training 
activities since the beginning of the military reform. 
Moscow’s armed forces provide most of the personnel 
and hardware for the joint exercises and take the lead 
on planning and organisation. In addition, the need 
for exercises with Russia has increased among some 
Allies. This applies particularly to those countries that 
are exposed to military threats (Armenia, Tajikistan) 
or are hardly in a position to conduct more complex 
exercises on a larger scale alone, due to scarce finances. 
For example, the armed forces of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan independently train almost exclusively 
at the tactical level; exercises at the operational or 
strategic level are held almost exclusively with Russia. 
Consequently, the armed forces of those three coun-
tries lack the capability to conduct major military 
operations on their own. These are only possible with 
Russian support, but not without or against Moscow. 
The focus of the exercises is largely determined by 
Moscow. Consequently, the larger Russian-Armenian 
manoeuvres did not take place near the Azerbaijani 
border but the Turkish border. This reflects Moscow’s 
view of Armenia as a ‘forward buffer’ against NATO’s 
south-eastern flank and not so much Yerevan’s con-
cerns over an attack by Azerbaijan. Something similar 
can be seen in relation to Belarus, where Moscow uses 
bilateral exercises to expand its military deployment 
options into and out of Belarus. Here, Russia is re-
hearsing large conventional operations in which 
Belarusian territory acts as a defence buffer and as 
a starting point for offensive actions. 
However, Russia’s demonstration of its hegemonic 
ambitions in Ukraine also resulted in individual CSTO 
members, particularly Belarus and Kazakhstan, now 
displaying more autonomy. For example, President 
Lukashenko insisted on the presence of Western mili-
tary observers at the Zapad 2017 exercise. Kazakh-
stan’s armed forces, which had formerly trained 
intensively with Moscow’s soldiers, failed to conduct 
a bilateral exercise for the first time in 2016. Instead, 
there was a trilateral manoeuvre involving non-CSTO 
member, Azerbaijan. 
Integrated structures 
In addition to cooperation on armaments, training 
and exercises, Russia is also creating integrated mili-
tary structures. In some cases this is done in the 
framework of new projects, in other cases projects are 
being implemented that have existed on paper for 
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some time or existing forms of de facto integration 
have been formalised. 
Integration with Abkhazia and South Ossetia is 
the most advanced. The Russian-Abkhazian Treaty on 
Alliance and Strategic Partnership of November 2014 
provides for the creation of a Common Space for 
Security and Defence. Accordingly, the joint group of 
forces was formed in November 2016, consisting of 
personnel from the Russian military base in Abkhazia 
and Abkhazian units. In peacetime, command of the 
joint military forces rotates; in case of a threat or a 
state of war, it passes to Russia.90 The “Alliance Rela-
tions and Integration Treaty” signed with South 
Ossetia in March 2015 also aims to create a “single 
defence space”. As a result, Russia “shall ensure the 
defence and security of the Republic of South Ossetia, 
including the protection and defence of the state 
border of the Republic of South Ossetia”.91 Although 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not formally an-
nexed, they represent a military outpost of Russia 
where the armed forces of both territories merely 
constitute an auxiliary force of the Russian army. 
Moscow has also created integrated military struc-
tures with Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, but to a lesser extent. These structures 
include Joint Air Defence Systems with Minsk, Yere-
van and Astana which have enabled Russia to move 
forward the protection of its airspace on the western, 
southern and south-eastern borders by several 
hundred kilometres. Similar contracts are being pre-
pared with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.92 
Russia also created integrated military structures 
with Belarus and Armenia. Under the umbrella of the 
CSTO, the “Regional Group of Russian and Belarusian 
 
90 “Dogovor mezhdu Rossijskoj Federaciej i Respublikoj 
Abkhazija o sojuznichestve i strategichestkom partnerstve” 
[Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic 
of Abkhazia on alliance and strategic partnership], Prezident 
Rossii [President of Russia] (official website), 24 November 
2014, http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/4783. 
91 “Dogovor mezhdu Rossijskoj Federaciej i respublikoj 
Juzhnaja Osetija o sojuznichestve i integracii” [Treaty be-
tween the Russian Federation and the Republic of South 
Ossetia on alliance and integration], Prezident Rossii [President 
of Russia] (official website), 18 March 2015, http://www. 
kremlin.ru/supplement/4819. 
92 Formally, Russia’s joint air defence systems with Ka-
zakhstan, Belarus and Armenia and, in future, with Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan make up parts of the planned CSTO Joint 
Air Defence System. However, at the current implementa-
tion stage, they are just bilateral projects. 
Armed Forces” was set up in 1999 to secure the 
territory of Belarus and the surrounding Russian 
regions, including Kaliningrad.93 This group exists 
only on paper in peacetime and can only be activated 
by the immediate threat of war by the presidents of 
both countries who then establish a common leader-
ship structure, formally securing Minsk a double veto 
in case Russia wants to activate the structure. Moscow 
is, therefore, pushing for deeper integration in order 
to strengthen its own position. At the end of 2015, 
Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu said, without 
agreement from Minsk, that a “Joint Military Organi-
sation” would be created in 2016 as part of the “Bela-
rusian-Russian Union State”, de facto uniting the 
armed forces of both countries.94 Minsk has not yet 
formally commented, which would indicate they are 
still sceptical. In contrast to Belarus, Armenia is in 
favour of Russia’s military integration plans, even 
after the Ukraine crisis, as it hopes to gain some secu-
rity in the conflict with Azerbaijan. As a result, in 
2016, Russia and Armenia created a Joint Association 
of Ground Forces, which goes further than the Rus-
sian-Belarusian format, as in peacetime it already has 
a joint command structure. In peacetime, the troops 
are under an Armenian general, but under the threat 
of war, command would automatically go to Russia’s 
strategic command “South”, which would give Mos-
cow easier access to the Armenian army forces.95 
Diverse (in)dependence 
Even though decades of military integration between 
the Soviet republics continue to be felt today, bilate-
ral relations are now highly diverse. How closely the 
post-Soviet states cooperate with Russia depends, 
 
93 It belongs to the entire Belarusian army and Russia’s 1st 
Guards Tank Army. As with the regional armed forces group 
with Armenia, it is formally a CSTO structure, but are actually 
bilateral projects. 
94 Back in 1997, Minsk and Moscow agreed to create a 
Single Defence Area as a goal of the newly established Union 
State. 
95 The Joint Association of Ground Forces of Russia and 
Armenia is based on the Regional Group of Armed Forces 
established in 2000 under the umbrella of the CSTO. Eduard 
Abrahamyan, “Russia and Armenia Establish Joint Ground 
Forces”, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 16 December 2016, 
https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/ 
item/13416-russia-and-armenia-establish-joint-ground-
forces.html. 
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firstly, on material benefit calculations, for example 
the desire for discounted arms supplies or subsidised 
training and military education. Secondly, Central 
Asian states in particular see cooperation with Mos-
cow as an opportunity to set limits on China’s grow-
ing economic and political influence in the area of 
security policy. Thirdly, actors in the post-Soviet 
space cooperate with Russia because they hope to 
gain greater protection against internal and external 
threats. However, Moscow can only establish uni-
lateral dependencies in the sense of the desired hege-
monic cooperation if the leadership of the respective 
partner country relies on Russian assistance to safe-
guard vital security interests. 
This applies to Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
the two breakaway Georgian areas of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. Due to a lack of financial and military 
resources, these states and regions are unable to in-
dependently ensure the protection of their territories 
or political regimes. In addition, they lack alternative 
military partners. The withdrawal of Russian military 
support could plunge all these states and territories 
into an existential crisis. Against this background, 
Moscow can largely determine the terms of coopera-
tion and in doing so promote its own interests. This 
can be seen from the fact that Moscow was able 
to successfully link the supply of required military 
equipment to extending its right to use military bases 
in the countries concerned for decades and to create 
integrated military structures in some of them. In 
this way, Russia can expand its own forward defence. 
Relations between Russia and the 
post-Soviet states are now 
highly diversified. 
Although Belarus and Kazakhstan cooperate 
closely with Russia on armaments, training, exercises 
and integrated structures, it is still difficult for Mos-
cow to create one-sided dependencies with them. 
Unlike the above-mentioned states and territories, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan do not see themselves ex-
posed to any external threats that would require 
Russia’s support to tackle. Rather, Russia’s interven-
tion in Ukraine has heightened concerns by Kazakh 
and Belarusian leaders about the vulnerabilities 
associated with bilateral cooperation. As a result, 
both countries reduced the scope of their military 
cooperation programmes with Russia. Minsk also 
successfully refused Moscow’s request to build a mili-
tary base in Belarus. Unlike Belarus, Kazakhstan also 
has alternative military partners. As part of its multi-
vectoral foreign policy, Astana regularly conducts 
exercises with the US, China and, since 2016, India; 
the same applies to armaments and training. Against 
this background, a significant expansion of military 
cooperation between Belarus and Kazakhstan with 
Russia is only likely if leaders there see their rule 
threatened by ‘colour revolutions’ and blame them 
on Western interference. 
Although Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan also cooperate militarily with Russia, bilateral 
cooperation with their large neighbour is extremely 
selective and very limited, so no one-sided dependen-
cies can be created to Russia’s advantage. While Turk-
menistan maintains its isolationist foreign policy, 
Azerbaijan continues to pursue its multi-vector ap-
proach in the military sphere. This means that in 
addition to limited cooperation with Russia, Baku 
cooperates closely with other partners such as Georgia 
and Turkey. The greatest dynamism comes from the 
activities of the new Uzbek leadership under Presi-
dent Shavkat Mirziyoyev. As a result, joint exercises 
between Uzbek and Russian soldiers have been re-
vived, and the country is once again making use 
of Russian training assistance. At the same time, how-
ever, Tashkent is eager to cooperate more intensively 
with other Central Asian states, leaving Russia out of 
the equation. This is in line with earlier efforts to 
gain a stronger position in Central Asia. 
Russia’s military cooperation with Georgia and 
Ukraine has ended. Until 2014, Ukraine was the only 
post-Soviet country not to be a member of the CSTO, 
but which still cooperated closely with Moscow on 
military education, armaments and training. How-
ever, as a result of its intervention, Russia has now 
lost all the leverage that resulted from this collabora-
tion. 
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In addition to bilateral cooperation, Moscow relies on 
multilateral institutions under whose umbrella the 
post-Soviet region can be more closely tied to Russia 
in military policy terms. These include the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS), which served as an 
important platform in military affairs in the first half 
of the 1990s.96 For example, the Red Army was divided 
up and transferred to the new national armies under 
the aegis of the CIS. Russia also used the organisation 
to have its ‘peacekeeping’ operations in the post-
Soviet space mandated multilaterally.97 In the second 
half of the 1990s, however, the CIS gradually lost 
its military significance and, since 2002, has been 
replaced in this policy field by the organisation of 
the Collective Security Treaty. 
The CSTO emerged from the Collective Security 
Treaty of the CIS. The Treaty was signed on 15 May 
1992 by six post-Soviet countries, including Russia, 
who pledged to provide assistance in the event of an 
external attack. In October 2002, the Defence Alliance 
was upgraded to the Collective Security Treaty Orga-
nization.98 Members of the CSTO now include Russia, 
Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan.99 Moscow sees the CSTO as a “key element of 
 
96 CIS today includes Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 
Ukraine and Turkmenistan are associated members and only 
participate in the organisation’s activities on certain occa-
sions. Ukrainian President, Petro Poroshenko, withdrew all 
remaining Ukrainian representatives from the CIS in May 
2018. 
97 CIS peacekeepers deployed in Tajikistan (1993–2000), 
Abkhazia (1994–2008) and Transnistria (1992–present) con-
sisted either entirely or mostly of Russian soldiers. 
98 Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 7 Octo-
ber 2002, http://www.odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php? 
ELEMENT_ID=1896. 
99 Signatories included Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1993, Georgia, Azer-
baijan and Belarus joined the Charter. Georgia, Azerbaijan 
security in the territory of the former Soviet Union”100 
and strives to “further develop it qualitatively”.101 On 
the one hand, the CSTO’s aim is to combat common 
threats more effectively. On the other hand, Moscow 
sees it as an instrument for tying member states 
closer to each other, both through attractive offers 
and common security interests. In addition, Moscow 
hopes to expand its own power projection capabilities 
in the region and from it by creating joint military 
structures that it could use if needed. Furthermore, 
Russian leaders assign a political function to the 
CSTO. It is expected to multilaterally mandate pos-
sible Russian military operations in the post-Soviet 
space.102 
Expanding military capabilities 
Russia is the defining force in the CSTO. It not only 
promotes the expansion of responsibilities and struc-
tures, but it also provides the majority of resources. 
The CSTO began as a collective defence alliance 
against external aggression, but is increasingly devel-
oping into a multifunctional organisation based on a 
broader understanding of security. This can be seen 
 
and Uzbekistan left the alliance again in 1999. Uzbekistan 
rejoined in 2006 before leaving again in 2012. 
100 “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” 
(see note 2). 
101 “Strategija nacional’noj bezopasnosti Rossijskoj Fede-
racii” (see note 2). 
102 For more on the Russian debate about CSTO, see A. V. 
Tichomirov, “Podchody osnovnych aktorov k razvitiju ODKB 
posle 2014 g. (Rossija, Belarus’, Kazakhstan)” [Approaches of 
major actors on the development of CSTO after 2014 (Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan)], in E. F. Dovgan’ and A. V. Rusakovich, 
Organisazija dogovora o kollektivnoj besopasnosti i planirovanie 
sluchaj chresvychajniych obstojatel’stv posle 2014 goda [Organiza-
tion of the Collective Security Treaty and planning for excep-
tional circumstances after 2014] (Geneva, 2015), 39–72. 
Connections via Multilateral 
Institutions: The CSTO 
Connections via Multilateral Institutions: The CSTO 
SWP Berlin 
Russia’s Military Policy in the Post-Soviet Space 
January 2019 
30 
in the gradual expansion of its range of tasks, which 
now include the fight against terrorism, extremism, 
organised crime, illegal migration, the smuggling of 
weapons and drugs as well as cooperation on crisis 
response, border protection and information secu-
rity.103 The “CSTO Collective Security Strategy up 
to 2025” from October 2016 also focuses on threats 
arising from a supposed Western regime change 
policy, such as “colour revolutions”, “information 
pressure” or “interference in the internal affairs of 
member states”.104 While this also reflects the con-
cerns of many authoritarian leaders in the organisa-
tion’s member states, they are certainly interested in 
receiving support from Russia to counter threats that 
could destabilise their regimes. However, Moscow 
benefits in particular from the extended responsibili-
ties of the alliance. This will make it formally easier 
to define a change of power in a member state 
not supported by Russia as a security problem for 
the entire alliance and to call for joint measures to 
be taken, from consultations to appointing crisis 
response forces. 
The CSTO has expanded its military 
structures. They are heavily 
dependent on Russia. 
Since the end of the 2000s, the CSTO has expanded 
its military structures in line with its extended re-
sponsibilities. Initially, these consisted only of forma-
tions intended for the core function of collective 
defence. To this end, Russia created three groups of 
regional armed forces – with Belarus, with Armenia 
and with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – to 
defend the respective subregions of Eastern Europe, 
the Caucasus and Central Asia against external at-
tacks.105 In the second half of the 2000s, the CSTO 
 
103 In 2010, Article 8 of the CSTO Charter was extended to 
include cooperation on crisis response, border management, 
information security and civil protection. Charter of the Collec-
tive Security Treaty Organization (see note 98). 
104 “Strategija kollektivnoj bezopasnosti Organisacii Dogo-
vora o kollektivnoj bezopasnosti na period do 2025 goda” 
[Strategy of collective security of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization for the period up to 2025], 14 October 
2016, ODKB [CSTO] (official website), http://www.odkb-csto. 
org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=8382. 
105 The Russian and Belarus Regional Forces Group and 
the United Armed Forces Group of Russia and Armenia are, 
in fact, bilateral structures and, as such, were dealt with in 
the previous chapter. In contrast, the Collective Rapid De-
then established new groups of mobile armed forces, 
in which all member countries participate. The Col-
lective Peacekeeping Forces was founded in 2007 and 
consists of around 3,600 personnel, mostly soldiers 
but also police and civilians. They can be deployed 
not only within alliance territory, but also outside 
of it, with a United Nations mandate. In turn, the 
“Collective Rapid Reaction Force” created in 2009 
has 17,000 personnel, mostly soldiers but also police, 
national guards and security forces. Its most impor-
tant task is to facilitate rapid intervention in local 
conflict situations. The two structures are to be sup-
ported by the “United Air Force”, which is still in the 
process of being set up.106 The new formations extend 
the CSTO’s range of operations beyond mere defence, 
for example, to ethnoterritorial conflicts in or be-
tween member states, the fight against terrorism and 
counterinsurgency, possibly in Afghanistan, as well as 
defending against colour revolutions. The new struc-
tures were established primarily at the instigation of 
Russia, while individual (then) member states, above 
all Uzbekistan and, to a degree, Belarus, were critical 
of the projects. Uzbekistan feared this would give 
Russia more leverage in Central Asia, while limiting 
its own freedom of action. The dispute over the Col-
lective Rapid Response Troops led to Uzbekistan 
leaving the CSTO in 2012.107 
Both groups of regional and mobile forces depend 
on Russia for personnel, equipment, training and 
leadership. For example, Moscow provides a brigade 
for the “Collective Peacekeepers” and a division and 
 
ployment Force in Central Asia is a multilateral structure 
made up of two Tajik, two Kazakh, one Kyrgyz and five 
Russian brigades. 
106 In April 2013, the CSTO announced its intention to 
create Collective Air Forces. The scope and location of the 
new structures are still unknown. “Sily i sredstva sistemy 
kollektivnoj bezopasnosti ODKB” [The forces and means 
of the collective security system of the CSTO], ODKB [CSTO] 
(official website), http://www.odkb-csto.org/js_csto/voennaya-
sostavlyauschaya-odkb/forces.php. 
107 While Uzbekistan had fundamental doubts about joint 
response forces, Belarusian restraint was more based on tac-
tical considerations. In the conflict over the price of Russian 
energy supplies, which was occurring at the same time, 
President Lukashenko made use of the consent requirement 
in the CSTO to exert pressure on the Russian leadership. 
Nevertheless, in October 2009, Belarus agreed while Uzbeki-
stan initially reserved the right to participate in the new 
structures on an ad hoc basis only. “Uzbekskoe ‘net’ dja 
KSOR” [Uzbekistan’s “No” to KSOR], Inosmi, 18 June 2009, 
https://inosmi.ru/world/20090618/249950.html. 
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a brigade for the “Collective Rapid Response Forces”. 
In contrast, apart from Kazakhstan, the other allies 
only contribute smaller units.108 For longer missions, 
their endurance also depends on Russian reinforce-
ments. Even though it is unclear who is in command 
in a specific operation, there is much to suggest that 
it, too, would be based on rehearsed Russian leader-
ship structures.109 In addition, the most important 
leadership positions in the Moscow-based Joint Mili-
tary Staff of the CSTO are occupied by Russian 
military personnel; both the chief and his first deputy 
are Russian generals.110 
Russia also invests the most in CSTO’s exercise 
activities.111 As a result, the number and complexity 
of the manoeuvres increased. Where only one exer-
cise per year took place before 2006, it has been four 
to six annually since 2012.112 The now regular stand-
ard exercises cover a wide range of tasks. They range 
from conventional warfare (exercise Vzaimodejstvie 
[Cooperation]) and combatting terrorism to drug 
 
108 The CSTO Joint Peacekeeping Force consists of one 
Russian brigade, one Kazakh battalion and smaller units 
from other allies. Russia makes its 98th Airborne Division 
and 31st Airborne Brigade available for the Collective Rapid 
Response Forces. Kazakhstan participates with an airborne 
brigade and a marine battalion, Belarus with a brigade and 
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with a battalion each. 
109 See Johan Norberg, High Ambitions, Harsh Realities. 
Gradually Building the CSTO’s Capacity for Military Intervention 
in Crises, FOI-R--3668--SE (Stockholm: FOI, May 2013), 6, 19f. 
According to information from CSTO, it had previously only 
planned to create command structures for the different 
deployment scenarios, but now they are working on a per-
manent command structure. This would further strengthen 
Russia’s influence. “Bezopasnost’ – delo kollektivnoe” [Secu-
rity is a collective matter], Krasnaja Zvezda, 15 February 2017, 2. 
110 While Russian generals occupy the top posts (Chief and 
First Deputy Chief of the Joint Military Staff), representatives 
from other member states act as Deputy Chiefs of the CSTO’s 
Joint Military Staff. “Nachal’nik Ob’edinjonnogo shtaba ODKB” 
[Head of the Joint Military Staff], ODKB [CSTO] (official web-
site), http://www.odbk-csto.org/js_csto/komandovanie/head. 
php. 
111 For example, Russian forces participate in most CSTO 
exercises and the majority of manoeuvres take place on 
Russian territory. Between 2003 and 2016, 14 CSTO exercises 
took place in Russia, eight each in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan 
and six in Kyrgyzstan. Marcel de Haas, “War Games of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Secu-
rity Treaty Organization: Drills on the Move!”, The Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 3 (2016): 378–406. 
112 Ibid., 392. 
smuggling (Rubezh [border], Kobal’t) and peacekeeping 
(Neruzhimoe Bratstvo [Indestructible Brotherhood]). 
The rehearsed scenarios provide an insight into which 
operations the CSTO is preparing for. While, until the 
Ukraine crisis, these were mainly stabilisation opera-
tions in Central Asia, they have since been practicing 
the defensive and offensive elements of a conventional 
and unconventional conflict again. This clearly re-
flects the shift in Russia’s focus in the wake of the 
Ukraine crisis and tense relations with the West. The 
first peacekeeping mission outside the CSTO area was 
simulated in 2016 and bears all the hallmarks of 
Russian influence113 because it is in line with delib-
erations to prepare the Joint Peacekeeping Forces for 
possible missions in Ukraine or Syria. 
To date, the CSTO has 
not completed a single mission. 
Although Russia has been investing in the devel-
opment of military structures and improved interop-
erability of the alliance since the end of the 2000s, it 
is uncertain how effective both would be on an actual 
mission. So far, the alliance has not had to pass any 
practical tests. Different standards of equipment and 
professionalisation and inadequately harmonised 
national laws suggest that multilateral cooperation 
beyond mere exercises would be fraught with prac-
tical pitfalls. There are a number of formal hurdles, 
for example with regard to Belarus. The country’s 
constitution prohibits the use of armed forces abroad 
except for defence and peacekeeping. This makes it 
impossible for Belarus to participate in many poten-
tial CSTO operations.114 For the militarily weak mem-
bers Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it is also likely to be 
difficult for them to actually deploy the promised 
forces with the required level of training and equip-
ment. Moreover, the military effectiveness of the 
 
113 “Kollektivnye mirotvorcheskie sily ODKB na uchenii 
‘nerushimoe bratstvo-2016’ otrabotali provedenie operacii 
po podderzhaniju mira po ‘mandatu Sovbeza OON’ v uslov-
noj strane, ne vchodjachshej v ODBK” [The collective peace 
forces of the CSTO practiced a peace mission on behalf of the 
United Nations in an imaginary non-member state of the 
CSTO during the “Indestructible Brotherhood 2016” manoeu-
vre], ODKB [CSTO] (official website), 27 August 2016, http:// 
www.odkb-csto.org/training/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=8047& 
SECTION_ID=250. 
114 The new military doctrine from 2016 reaffirmed this 
restriction. “Voennaja Doktrina Respubliki Belarus’”, 20 July 
2016, http://www.mil.by/ru/military_policy/doktrina/. 
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CSTO suffers from the fact that allies often use the 
organisation merely as an umbrella for de facto 
bilateral cooperation. This is particularly true for 
armaments and training cooperation where Moscow 
is trying to bind the other member states with sub-
sidised prices and attractive programmes. While this 
promotes Moscow’s position as the alliance’s centre 
of gravity, there is a lack of robust military interoper-
ability between the remaining members on joint 
exercises or on educational and training cooperation. 
Consequently, the value of the CSTO to Moscow is less 
the gains in military capability or burden sharing, 
and more the prospect of multilateral legitimacy 
which the alliance could give to Russian hegemony in 
general and specifically to any Russia-led operations. 
Limited dominance 
In order to use the CSTO as a legitimisation tool, 
Russia would have to dominate the political decision-
making process within the organisation. Certainly, 
the Alliance Charter postulates equality between the 
member states and each participating country has 
one vote and a veto right in the committees.115 How-
ever, in terms of personnel and structure, Russia is 
the most influential force in the CSTO and provides 
the majority of its leadership personnel. Nikolay 
Bordyusha was Secretary General of the organisation 
from 2003 to 2017. Prior to that, he had held senior 
posts in Russia’s security sector and diplomatic ser-
vice. After the decision was taken in 2015 to appoint 
someone to the position every three years in rotation, 
Moscow was able to ensure that the first successor 
would come from Armenia, the member state most 
dependent on Russia.116 Russia continues to be dis-
 
115 Until 2010, there was a strict consensus principle in 
the CSTO which was later weakened at the behest of Russia. 
It is now possible to adopt resolutions in ‘limited format’. If 
one member votes neither against nor explicitly for a resolu-
tion, it is deemed to have been adopted, but then it is not 
binding on the state that abstains. This change was imple-
mented after several attempts by Uzbekistan to block Rus-
sian integration projects by refusing to give their consent. 
Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (see note 98). 
116 The new General Secretary of CSTO, Armenian Yuri 
Chachaturov, who was appointed in April 2017, can look 
back on a long career in the Soviet and Armenian armed 
forces. On 2 November 2018, the new Armenian leadership 
recalled Chachaturov from his post because he took part in 
a violent suppression of opposition demonstrations in 2008. 
proportionately represented in the alliance leader-
ship, holding the position of Deputy Secretary-
General and two of five management posts in the 
administrative departments.117 In addition, the main 
institutions of the CSTO, the Secretariat and the Joint 
Military Staff, are based in Moscow. 
Although the CSTO depends on Russia’s political 
will and military capabilities, Moscow is only able to 
use the organisation as a tool for multilateral legiti-
macy and assert its interests to a limited degree. This 
is related to both a deep distrust of Russian domi-
nance claims and a lack of internal coherence. One 
of Moscow’s greatest successes to date is that, in 
December 2011, member states agreed to only ap-
prove new military bases of non-member states on 
their territory if all other alliance members agree.118 
Although the need for consensus has formally limited 
Moscow’s room for manoeuvre, it benefits most from 
the new rule. According to its self-image as a great 
power, Russia has no intention of allowing foreign 
troops to set foot on its soil. In contrast, some mem-
ber states have used the military bases of other coun-
tries as an important source of revenue or as a key 
element of their multi-vector foreign policy. For in-
stance, the US has operated air bases in Kyrgyzstan 
(2001–2014) and Uzbekistan (2001–2005) and 
Germany had an air transport base in Uzbekistan 
(2001–2015). Since the withdrawal of Western troops 
in 2015, India has remained the only third country to 
maintain a military base on CSTO territory, namely 
in Tajikistan since 2002. The CSTO regulation from 
2011 only refers to new military bases and excludes 
Uzbekistan since its withdrawal from the alliance in 
2012, so it had no effect on the closure of US and Ger-
man military bases. Nevertheless, in the future it will 
 
While Armenia’s leaderships claims the right to appoint a 
new Armenian candidate for the post of secretary general, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan voiced their support to fill the post 
with a Belarussian candidate. Eduard Abrahamyan, “Internal 
Discord in CSTO May be Pushing Armenia to Leave Russia-led 
Alliance”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, no. 168 (19 November 
2018), https://jamestown.org/program/internal-discord-in-
csto-may-be-pushing-armenia-to-leave-russia-led-alliance/. 
117 “Ustavnye organy” [Statutory Bodies], ODKB [CSTO] (offi-
cial website), http://www.odkb-csto.org/authorized_organs/ 
list.php?SECTION_ID=102. 
118 According to Article 7 of the CSTO Charter, not only 
military bases but also military infrastructure require approv-
al. Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (see 
note 98). 
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be more difficult for the allies to station troops from 
other states on their territory.119 
Moscow wanted to deploy CSTO 
peacekeepers in Syria, but Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan refused. 
Overall, the CSTO allies are keen to maintain their 
ability to act autonomously and are reluctant to 
respond when Moscow calls for allegiance. The CSTO 
Charter provides for member states to coordinate 
their positions on regional and international security 
issues.. However, member states demonstrated a cer-
tain reluctance to follow Russia’s line of argumenta-
tion, in particular with regard to cases of Russian 
aggression in the post-Soviet space. For example, after 
the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, the CSTO con-
demned “Georgia’s attempt to resolve the conflict 
with South Ossetia through military means” and 
supported “Russia’s active role in creating peace and 
cooperation in the region”.120 However, none of the 
allies followed Moscow in recognising Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia as independent states. In the crisis over 
Ukraine, the CSTO recognised the legitimacy of the 
Crimean referendum; at the same time, the Special 
Summit convened by Russia in May 2014 only man-
aged to provide lukewarm support for Moscow. As 
a result, “all sides” were encouraged to “ease ten-
sions”.121 As a sign of his disapproval of Russia’s 
policy, the Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
did not even go to the summit. 
In Russia’s conflict with NATO, its allies also do 
not clearly position themselves on Moscow’s side. The 
CSTO certainly supports Russia’s core positions, such 
 
119 One loophole is to give external actors access to ports 
or airports as transit hubs only, without establishing a mili-
tary infrastructure or base there. As a result, despite criti-
cism from Russia, Kazakhstan concluded an agreement with 
the US in 2018 which allows it to transport non-military 
goods through the Kazakh ports of Aktau and Kuryk. Ivan 
Minin, “Zachem Nazarbaevu voennaja baza SSHA na Kaspii” 
[Why Nazarbayev is giving the US a military base in the 
Caspian Sea], News.ru, 26 April 2018, https://news.ru/v-mire/ 
poyavitsya-li-na-kaspii-voennaya-baza-ssha/. 
120 “Press Conference Following the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization Summit”, President of Russia (official 
website), 5 September 2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ 
president/transcripts/1309. 
121 Joanna Lillis, “Is Putin’s Eurasian Vision Losing 
Steam?”, Eurasianet, 9 May 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/ 
node/68360. 
as calling for a new Euro-Atlantic security order, 
criticises NATO’s military activities on the territory of 
Eastern European Alliance members and demonstra-
tively conducts training exercises on the borders of 
NATO countries.122 Moscow also persuaded member 
states to adopt threat categories from Russian military 
doctrine, such as the US’s strategic missile defence, in 
the “CSTO Collective Defence Strategy for the period 
until 2025”.123 However, the allies refuse to reduce 
their bilateral cooperation with NATO124 and to trans-
form the CSTO into an “Anti-NATO”, as Russia has 
consistently called for since 2014.125 This is true even 
for Armenia, whose security depends on Russia. In 
February 2017, the then Armenian President Serzh 
Sargsyan declared, “There is no doubt the CSTO and 
NATO pursue different goals, but our policy shows 
that it is possible for a country to find ways to co-
operate in different formats”.126 
Russia also failed in its only attempt to date to 
activate the military structures of the CSTO. In order 
to share burdens and give a multilateral touch to 
a unilateral military operation, Moscow proposed 
deploying CSTO peacekeepers in Syria. But both 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan refused.127 
However, Moscow’s instrumentalising of the CSTO 
is hampered not only by the other member states’ 
 
122 In August 2016, the CSTO conducted an exercise on 
the border of Latvia and Estonia which included elements of 
psychological warfare. Joshua Kucera, “Russia to Enlist Allies 
in Fight against NATO”, Eurasianet, 13 December 2016, http:// 
www.eurasianet.org/node/81646. 
123 “Strategija kollektivnoj bezopasnosti” (see note 104). 
124 Despite CSTO members undertaking in Article 1 of the 
Collective Security Treaty of 1992 not to join any military 
alliance directed against a CSTO ally, membership of the 
CSTO does not preclude close cooperation with other defence 
alliances. The CSTO countries cooperate to varying degrees 
with NATO, from taking part in Partnership for Peace, to 
participation in training programmes and joint exercises. 
125 At the CSTO Summit in December 2016, Russia put 
forward a proposal to develop the CSTO into a stronger coun-
terweight to NATO. 
126 “Armenia’s Accession to CSTO and Cooperation with 
NATO Fully Combinable – President Sargsyan”, Armenpress, 
27 February 2017, https://armenpress.am/eng/news/880516/ 
armenia%E2%80%99s-accession-to-csto-and-cooperation-
with-nato-fully-combinable-%E2%80%93-president-
sargsyan.html. 
127 Uran Botobekov, “Russia Wants CSTO to Deploy to 
Syria”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, no. 89 (10 July 2017), 
https://jamestown.org/program/russia-wants-csto-allies-
deploy-syria/. 
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concerns with regard to Russia’s hegemonic inten-
tions, but also by the alliance’s lack of internal 
cohesion. Lack of trust, divergent priorities and in-
dividual interests make it difficult to take joint 
action. The relationship between Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan suffers from unresolved border issues and 
relations between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are also 
tense. Given the mutual mistrust of Central Asian 
member states, it is therefore likely to be difficult 
to reach consensus on the need for a CSTO crisis 
management mission in Central Asia, if one were 
required. It can also be assumed that the level of 
alliance solidarity would be low in the case of an 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. After all, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have close cultural and 
religious ties as well as economic and political rela-
tions with Azerbaijan, which outweigh those with 
their ally Armenia. Even Belarus’ ties with Azerbaijan 
are closer than with Armenia. The lack of inner 
cohesion reveals itself repeatedly when hostilities 
near Karabakh escalate, as they did in 2016. Although 
these hostilities were not a case for the alliance, as it 
was not an Azerbaijani attack on Armenian territory, 
nevertheless, it is precisely the Central Asian allies 
who do not even provide diplomatic support to Yere-
van in these cases, but instead take sides with Azer-
baijan. Responding bitterly, Armenian President Sarg-
syan complained at the CSTO summit in December 
2015, “if we do not find it necessary to pick up the 
phone and find out what is happening in allied Ar-
menia and if we vote against the interests of another 
member in international organisations, (...) then we 
bring the whole organisation [CSTO], its reputation 
and meaning into (...) question”.128 
Russia itself is only willing and able to regulate 
conflicts between its allies to a limited degree. Rather, 
it is keen not to let itself be drawn so far into these 
disputes that it would have to take a clear position. 
This limits the ability of the CSTO to contribute to 
solving regional security problems. When rioting 
broke out between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 2010 
and the Kyrgyz President asked Moscow for support, 
Russian leaders rejected a CSTO mission.129 Border 
 
128 “S. Sargsyan’s Speech at CSTO Collective Security Coun-
cil Session Had Messages, Unpleasant Reminders: Expert”, 
panorama.am, 22 December 2015, https://www.panorama. 
am/en/news/2015/12/22/president-armenia-csto-tigran-
abrahamyan/1503058. 
129 Deirdre Tynan, “CSTO Indecisive on Kyrgyzstan Inter-
vention”, Eurasianet, 14 June 2010, http://www.eurasianet. 
org/node/61294. 
disputes between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which 
has already left the Alliance, escalated in 2016. The 
Kyrgyz President called for an extraordinary meeting 
of the CSTO Council to send a strong signal of alliance 
solidarity. However, the alliance’s response was 
muted and they only sent the Deputy Secretary Gen-
eral to monitor the situation. Moscow, in particular, 
showed little interest in straining the bilateral rap-
prochement with Uzbekistan that had only just 
begun.130 Putin’s statement to the National Security 
Council in July 2014 demonstrates clearly how little 
Moscow feels bound by the CSTO. He stated that 
Russia is, “fortunately not a member of an alliance. 
This also guarantees our sovereignty.”131 
Overall, the CSTO has so far lacked effectiveness, 
both as a security provider to member states and as a 
hegemonic tool of Russia. Both sides see the alliance 
primarily as a tool rather than an arena or even an 
actor. The crisis over Ukraine finally revealed the 
divergent expectations and the limited benefits of the 
alliance. For most member states, the organisation 
is merely an umbrella under which they can pursue 
their particular self-interests bilaterally with Moscow, 
in the form of subsidised armaments supplies, train-
ing activities and military education programmes.132 
Instead of dealing with regional problems through 
multilateral cooperation, they prefer to negotiate 
directly with Moscow. Like the other member states, 
Russia sees the CSTO primarily as an umbrella for its 
diverse bilateral relations. Since the allegiance Russia 
had expected from the alliance only occurred to a 
limited degree, development of the CSTO has stag-
nated since 2014. 
 
130 Joshua Kucera, “In Another Central Asian Security 
Crisis, Moscow Again Stands Aside”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
29 March 2016, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/78006. 
131 “Security Council Meeting”, President of Russia (official 
website), 22 July 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/events/president/ 
news/46305. 
132 Anna Kreikemeyer, “Herrschaft statt Sicherheit: Die 
Organisation des Vertrags für Kollektive Sicherheit”, Ost-
europa 62, no. 5 (2012): 81–92 (84). 
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The track record of Russian military policy in the 
post-Soviet space in terms of the three objectives 
pursued, namely to ward off threats, control the 
region and restrict the scope for action of external 
actors, is mixed. On the one hand, Moscow has been 
able to increase its ability to deter or ward off threats 
in and out of the region. After having modernised the 
Russian armed forces since 2008, they can now cover 
a wider range of objectives in the post-Soviet space. 
Although Russia’s new operations would be subject 
to military limits beyond political considerations, for 
example due to difficult transport routes (Central 
Asia, Moldova) and the fact that some of its rapidly 
deployable forces are currently tied up in the Ukraine 
and Syria. Moscow’s army is, nevertheless, far better 
able today than before the Russo-Georgian war to 
respond quickly to new dynamics and deter other 
actors with a show of military might. Through the 
expansion of its overseas bases, extended A2/AD 
capabilities and agreements on joint air defence, 
Russia has also been able to ensure that parts of the 
post-Soviet space act as a buffer against external 
threats. 
Moscow only has limited ability 
to exercise hegemony over the 
post-Soviet space. 
On the other hand, Moscow’s military policy is 
limited in its ability to realise its desired hegemony 
over the post-Soviet space and limit the scope for 
action of external actors. While the interventions 
in Georgia and Ukraine led to Kiev and Tbilisi losing 
control of parts of their territory and the prospects 
of both countries acceding to NATO being severely 
hampered, this did not mean that Georgia and 
Ukraine merged into Moscow’s claimed zone of in-
fluence, on the contrary: Both countries have turned 
decisively against Russia and other post-Soviet states’ 
scepticism of its hegemonic ambitions has increased. 
This is true even for countries that previously co-
operated closely with Russia, such as Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. If they perceived Russia primarily as a 
security provider until 2014, they increasingly regard 
their large neighbour as a potential danger – though 
have yet to say as much. This applies in particular to 
concerns about hybrid scenarios, which were included 
in the military doctrines of Belarus and Kazakhstan 
for the first time in 2016 and 2017 respectively. Ac-
cordingly, they are trying to eliminate as many entry 
points for Russian influence as possible, for example 
by training fewer Belarusian and Kazakh officers 
in Russia. In addition, the national identity of both 
countries is being promoted considerably more 
strongly by the state than before the Ukraine crisis. 
Kazakhstan’s transition from the Cyrillic to the Latin 
alphabet in 2017 should also be seen in this context 
as an attempt to limit the ‘soft’ influence of Russia 
and its media channels.133 
The post-Soviet space does not form a 
homogeneous sphere of influence. 
At best, Russia has achieved ambivalent results, 
not only with its coercive diplomacy. Also, the expec-
tation of creating unilateral dependence on Russia 
 
133 “Voennaja Doktrina Respubliki Belarus’” (see note 114); 
“Voennaja Doktrina Respubliki Kazachstan”, 20 July 2016, 
http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=37940951#pos=14;
-105; Elya Altynsarina, “Kazakhstan Adopts New Version of 
Latin-based Kazakh Alphabet”, The Astana Times (online), 26 
February 2018, https://astanatimes.com/2018/02/kazakhstan-
adopts-new-version-of-latin-based-kazakh-alphabet/. 
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through cooperation proved to be misguided in many 
respects. Moscow has only achieved any notable suc-
cess with this strategy in territories and states that 
depend on its military protection, such as Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, Transnistria, Armenia and, to some 
extent, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, this 
approach has been less effective against Kazakhstan 
and Belarus, and completely ineffective against Azer-
baijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan who only 
cooperate selectively and to a limited degree with 
Russia. Contrary to Russian claims, the post-Soviet 
space is therefore not a homogeneous sphere of 
influence, but rather a patchwork of eleven states 
each with its own distinct military relationship with 
Russia. 
This differentiated picture of the post-Soviet space 
is also reflected in the activities of external actors. 
Moscow’s claim to be exclusively responsible for the 
security of the region and, therefore, to limit the 
scope for action of other states and institutions can 
only be implemented in part. Certainly Russia was 
able to secure a veto over the construction of future 
military bases in the CSTO area and the separatist 
areas of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and 
Donbas also cooperate solely with Moscow. But even 
Belarus and Armenia, which are facing strong pres-
sure from Russia to reduce their already limited forms 
of dialogue and cooperation with external actors, are 
trying to stick to these formats. For example, in 2017, 
the Armenian Defence Minister said that when it 
came to cooperation with CSTO and NATO, its coun-
try was “guided by the principle of ‘both/and’ rather 
than ‘either/or’”.134 The remaining states are seeking 
to expand their military partnerships within a multi-
vectoral approach, thereby reducing their dependence 
on Russia. As a result, it can be observed that China is 
playing an increasingly important role in security 
policy in Central Asia. This applies not only to multi-
lateral formats that include Russia, such as the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization (SCO), but also to bilat-
eral cooperation. China’s People’s Liberation Army is 
conducting bilateral exercises with the Central Asian 
states, assisting Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in training 
and equipping their armed forces. China’s investment 
in the Belt and Road Initiative should further strength-
 
134 Siranush Ghazanchyan, “No Controversy between 
Armenia’s Membership in CSTO and Cooperation with 
NATO”, Public Radio of Armenia, 29 March 2017, http://www. 
armradio.am/en/2017/03/29/no-controversy-between-
armenias-membership-in-csto-and-cooperation-with-nato/. 
en its position in Central Asia, as well as in other 
parts of the post-Soviet space.135 In the South Cau-
casus and Black Sea region, Turkey and, increasingly, 
Iran have also established themselves as important 
military partners for Azerbaijan and Georgia. The first 
formal four-party meeting, at which military issues 
were also discussed, took place in March 2018 be-
tween Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran. For 
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, the Atlantic Alliance 
and individual Western states have become their 
preferred partners. However, the US and NATO also 
played an important part in Kazakhstan’s multi-
vectoral approach, as evidence by Astana granting the 
US Armed Forces port rights to transit from Afghani-
stan in 2018. For some years now, cooperation with 
external partners has been increasingly accompanied 
by regionalisation tendencies without Russian partici-
pation. Since taking office in 2016, Uzbek President 
Shavkat Mirziyoyev has sought to develop bilateral 
relations with the other Central Asian states. In 2017, 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan also signed a joint mili-
tary cooperation plan for the first time, which pro-
vides for cooperation on training, exercises and edu-
cation. This reflects Mirziyoyev’s ambition to give 
Uzbekistan more weight in Central Asia and not leave 
the initiatives solely to Russia or China.136 
The limited benefits of Russian bilateral and multi-
lateral ties may give Moscow even more incentive to 
focus on expanding its unilateral power projection 
capabilities. However, this could turn out to be coun-
terproductive. Should Moscow, after the Russo-Geor-
gian war, threaten or reassert military intervention 
in the post-Soviet space, for example, by flexing its 
muscles on the border or through non-linear opera-
tions, states such as Kazakhstan, Belarus or Uzbeki-
stan may be increasingly less willing to cooperate 
with Moscow. This points to the fundamental weak-
nesses of Russian military policy in the post-Soviet 
space, namely a lack of trust and asymmetric expec-
tations. Certainly, many post-Soviet states are using 
Russia’s offer of military cooperation for their own 
interests. Many state leaders in the region also recog-
nise the importance of Moscow as a key partner in 
 
135 See Martin Breitmaier, China’s Rise and Central Asia’s Secu-
rity, Issue Alert no. 21/2016 (Paris: European Union Institute for 
Security Studies [EUISS], June 2016), https://www.iss.europa. 
eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_21_Central_Asia_MB.pdf. 
136 Malika Orazgaliyeva, “Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Sign 
First Military Cooperation Plan”, The Astana Times (online), 
22 August 2017, https://astanatimes.com/2017/08/kazakhstan-
uzbekistan-sign-first-military-cooperation-plan/. 
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countering threats and maintaining the stability of 
their authoritarian regimes. In the case of a ‘colour 
revolution’ in one of these countries, it could certainly 
send a military request for help to Russia. At the same 
time, however, only a few post-Soviet states accept 
Russia’s hegemonic notions of political order. 
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Russia’s military policy in the post-Soviet space is a 
military, and above all, a regulatory challenge for 
Germany, the EU and NATO. Since the end of the 
2000s, Russian forces have strengthened their mili-
tary position in the post-Soviet space. A clear shift of 
emphasis from Central Asia to the West and the Black 
Sea region can be observed, which is manifested, 
among other things, in the expansion of integrated 
air defence with Belarus and Armenia, as well as in 
an increased presence on the Crimean peninsula. As a 
result, Moscow is not only extending its buffer against 
the Atlantic Alliance, but also its power projection 
capabilities against eastern and south-eastern NATO 
members. Germany should, therefore, continue to 
support NATO’s efforts to reassure those allies with 
contributions of its own. However, a policy based 
primarily on reassurance and deterrence will only 
aggravate the security dilemma between Russia and 
NATO. Germany should, therefore, also intensify its 
efforts to develop conventional arms controls and the 
accompanying military transparency and limitation 
measures (Vienna Document, Open Skies). It also 
needs to increase its commitment to building trust. 
This includes ‘structured dialogue’ within the OSCE, 
initiated by Germany, in which the participating 
states exchange views on threat perceptions, military 
arrangements and security-building measures.137 In 
addition, trust-building formats should be revived 
with Russia’s armed forces, albeit in an amended 
form so as not to give the impression of a return to 
business as usual. However, this approach will not 
achieve quick results. Rather, the value of dialogue 
lies in counteracting the trend for perceptions, which 
are now completely decoupled from the facts, to 
 
137 See Wolfgang Richter, Die OSZE zwischen Konfrontation 
und “Strukturiertem Dialog”. Unter Österreichs Vorsitz bekennt sich 
die Organisation zu ihrer friedensstiftenden Rolle, SWP-Aktuell 
5/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 
2018). 
become even more entrenched. Germany, in particu-
lar, can draw on greater experience in dialogue and 
use it to shape future measures. But such steps can 
only mitigate the security dilemma. It can only be 
resolved when the underlying fundamental conflict 
over the European security order is overcome. 
Russia’s claim to its own zone of influence in the 
post-Soviet space conflicts with the principles of in-
ternal and external sovereignty of states agreed in the 
Charter of Paris, as well as with their right to choose 
their alliances freely. The open demonstration of 
Russia’s intentions and capabilities in the Ukraine 
crisis, which included the use of military force to en-
force its claim, not only aggravated the conflict over 
security order, but also further eroded confidence in 
Moscow’s expected reliability. This limits the possi-
bilities for Western actors and Russia to cooperate 
on security policy in the post-Soviet space. There is a 
need for cooperation, especially in dealing with trans-
national threats such as terrorism, drug and arms 
smuggling, and ethnoterritorial conflicts. Although 
Moscow benefits from the continuation of ‘frozen 
conflicts’, it has no interest in seeing them spiral out 
of control. In such cases, Russia can exert a moderat-
ing influence on the parties to the dispute, as it did in 
the spring of 2016 when fighting between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan ended. The need for Moscow to play 
a constructive role is increasing, given the growing 
threat of escalation in the Armenian-Azerbaijani rela-
tionship since the change of leadership in Yerevan. 
As a result of Russia’s military capabilities and its 
deployment in the post-Soviet space, there may be 
greater demand in the region itself for future Russian 
involvement, for example in the event of further de-
stabilisation in Afghanistan. At the same time, many 
post-Soviet countries are critical of Russia’s unilateral 
measures or bilateral cooperation because they fear 
the concomitant power asymmetry. 
Before 2014, there were already practical coopera-
tion projects within the NATO-Russia Council for 
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dealing with transnational threats, for example joint 
training for drug fighters in Central Asia or equipping 
the Afghan armed forces. With regard to Afghanistan 
and Central Asia, the CSTO had repeatedly encour-
aged formal cooperation with NATO prior to the 
Ukraine crisis.138 Since 2014, the challenge for West-
ern actors has been to continue to rely on cooperation 
with Moscow in dealing with certain security issues, 
but at the same time not to give the appearance of 
recognising Russia’s hegemonic role by cooperating 
with it. Against this backdrop, proposals to completely 
‘normalise’ NATO-Russia relations should be avoided, 
as they could all too easily be exploited as an ex-post 
legitimisation of Russian aggression in Ukraine. How-
ever, it makes sense to build on successful projects 
initiated by the NATO-Russia Council and develop 
new initiatives that involve the Central Asian states 
to a greater extent than in the past, for example in 
the fight against drug and arms smuggling. In con-
trast, formal cooperation between NATO and CSTO 
would not appear to make any sense. Firstly, the 
CSTO has so far not proved effective in managing 
internal conflicts or external crisis management. The 
disagreements and mistrust between member states 
are too deep for it to act as a stable basis for coopera-
tion. Secondly, there is a danger that cooperation 
with the CSTO will be misunderstood as de facto 
legitimising Russia’s hegemonic claim. This would 
strengthen an organisation whose members have 
been increasingly sceptical about this claim since 
2014. 
In addition to dealing with Russia, Germany and 
NATO are also interested in shaping relations with 
the other states in the post-Soviet space. The focus is 
on states aspiring to become members of the Atlantic 
Alliance (Georgia and, possibly, Ukraine), and on 
those who, to varying degrees, engage in dialogue 
or cooperate with NATO without wanting to join it. 
As far as Georgia and Ukraine are concerned, NATO 
should resist attempts to see rapid accession to the 
Alliance as part of a geopolitical containment policy 
 
138 In 2003, the CSTO proposed formal cooperation with 
NATO, especially when dealing with security issues from 
Afghanistan. Out of concern for implicitly recognising 
Russia’s claim to hegemony in the post-Soviet space and 
because of differing views among alliance members, NATO 
never responded to the proposal. In 2014, the CSTO with-
drew it. “CSTO Suspends Dialogue with NATO”, New Europe, 
10 November 2014, https://www. neweurope.eu/article/csto-
suspends-dialogue-nato/. 
towards Russia, and instead ensure the entry criteria 
are met in full. Otherwise, it risks losing its credibility 
not only as a military but also as a normative actor, 
increasing the risk of a violent escalation of the con-
flict over security order. 
At the same time, the loss of trust in Russia since 
the Ukraine crisis opens up the possibility for NATO 
to cooperate more intensively with those post-Soviet 
countries that have so far focused their security policy 
predominantly on Russia, in particular Armenia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Offers of cooperation should 
cover three areas: Firstly, that there is a pragmatic 
pursuit of common interests in countering trans-
national threats, for instance through military edu-
cation, training and equipment. The second area is 
trust building and transparency. Here, individual 
NATO members, such as Germany and Poland, could 
lead the way and, for example, engage in dialogue 
with Belarusian and Kazakh forces. Thirdly, efforts 
should be made to strengthen transformation pro-
cesses towards democracy and the rule of law, for 
example by promoting democratic control over the 
armed forces. Since most of the post-Soviet states 
have (semi-)authoritarian regimes in power, their 
interest in this area of cooperation will be low. How-
ever, NATO, in coordination with the EU, could pro-
vide incentives on the topic of resilience by helping 
the countries concerned reduce their social, political 
and economic vulnerabilities and thus reduce oppor-
tunities for Russia’s non-linear operations. 
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Abbreviations 
A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization 
DOSAAF Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the 
Army, Aviation, and Navy 
EU European Union 
EUISS European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(Paris) 
IISS The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(London) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe 
OSW Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich  
(Centre for Eastern Studies) (Warsaw) 
RUSI Royal United Services Institute for Defence 
Studies (London) 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(Solna) 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
